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ABSTRACT

The purpose of my research is to investigate how perceptions of retributive justice influence
tax compliance. I address this objective by proposing two research questions: (1) How do
taxpayers perceive the propriety of punishment for tax evasion? (2) How and when are
observers’ compliance intentions influenced by perceptions of fairness disclosures about a
specific retributive outcome, and the presence of a fairness-relevant disclosure?
To address the first research question, I conduct a survey of 331 adult Canadian taxpayers to
ascertain the extent to which taxpayers perceive punishments for tax evasion as fair or unfair. I
find that an appropriate punishment is viewed as a fine equal to the amount of taxes evaded.
To address the second research question, I conduct an experiment using 400 adult Canadian
taxpayers. In this experiment, I examine two levels of retributive justice disclosures regarding
punishment outcomes where punishments for offences are perceived as too lenient (unfair)
versus just right (fair), and I also examine how the combination of fairness disclosures about a
specific retributive outcome, and the presence of a justice-relevant disclosure influence tax
compliance. I find that when taxpayers are presented with multiple justice disclosures, they
anchor on the disclosure presented first. Specifically, when the justice-relevant disclosure
precedes the retributive justice disclosure the differential effect on observers' compliance from
the retributive justice disclosure will be suppressed. However, when a retributive justice
disclosure precedes another justice-relevant disclosure, observers will anchor on the retributive
justice disclosure, and the justice-relevant disclosure will not significantly alter their initial
fairness judgment.

ii

My research extends the retributive justice and tax compliance literatures by carefully
examining retributive justice disclosures at a more fine-grained level, and provides an
incremental contribution to the retributive justice literature by demonstrating the differential
impact of retributive justice perceptions on subsequent behaviour. Moreover, this research is the
first to examine when and how retributive justice disclosures or other tax-related justice-relevant
disclosures can act as an anchor in decision making. Thus, my research contributes to existing
research that examines how justice judgments can be used as an anchor which may influence
subsequent tax reporting behaviour.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“Sunlight is the best disinfectant…” Louis Brandeis

Authorities with a mandate to uphold ethical standards in society often disclose or shine a
light on unethical behaviours. For instance, tax authorities such as the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA) publicly disclose tax offences and related punishments on their websites and other social
media newsfeeds. By publicly disclosing tax misreporting offences and punishments, a tax
authority signals that such unethical behaviours will not be tolerated, and highlights its
dedication to maintaining the integrity of the tax system (Government of Canada 2020). As the
quote by Louis Brandeis implies, shining a light on unethical behaviours may be one way to
deter observers. Deterring tax misreporting is important as tax noncompliance costs billions of
dollars annually. 1 Whether there is a salutary effect on compliance arising from observers’
perceptions of tax evaders’ punishments is an unexplored empirical issue, and motivates the
research in this dissertation.
Retributive justice emphasizes the importance of imposing a “subjectively appropriate
punishment of individuals or groups who have violated rules, laws, or norms…” (Wenzel &
Okimoto 2016, 238). Punishments imposed must be in response to a wrongdoing and must be
imposed by another party unilaterally. In a tax context, repayment of taxes evaded can restore a
wrong; however, an additional response to this wrongdoing can be meted out as a fine and
possible imprisonment. On the contrary, when punishments imposed on tax offenders do not

1

In the US, tax evasion accounted for approximately USD$291 billion from 2008-2010 (Internal Revenue Service
2016). Annually, noncompliance costs the UK government £3.4 billion (Cannon 2018) and the Canadian
government CAD$8.7 billion (Government of Canada 2020).
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match or align with the wrongdoing committed, a retributive justice failure occurs. Observers
may form justice perceptions by examining an offence relative to a punishment, and in doing so
can learn vicariously about the competence of an authority. Thus, perceptions of retributive
justice or its failure can guide observers’ compliance decisions (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock &
Scott 2004).
Overall, the relationship between retributive justice and tax compliance has scarcely been
examined by tax researchers (see Farrar & King 2021; Kogler, Muehlbacher & Kirchler 2015
and Mahangila & Holland 2015), despite scholarly acknowledgement that retributive justice is an
important and under-studied concept in the tax compliance domain (Kirchler 2007). As such,
knowledge about the impact of retributive justice and retributive justice failure is incomplete.
Particularly, the retributive justice tax literature has yet to explore two keys research gaps. First,
there is no evidence as to how taxpayers – Canadian or otherwise – perceive the appropriateness
of punishment for tax evasion. Second, the retributive justice tax literature has yet to examine
how observers’ compliance intentions are influenced by the knowledge of different punishment
outcomes for tax evaders. I will address these research gaps across two complementary studies
using a survey and an experiment, respectively. Each study is discussed in turn.
In the survey (study 1), I investigate the propriety of a punishment for tax evasion.
Particularly, I examine the extent to which participants perceive punishments for tax evasion as
too lenient, just right, and too harsh. I collect data using a two-part complementary survey on a
sample of Canadian taxpayers where (1) participants were randomly assigned to one punishment
disclosure condition and asked to rate the severity of only the punishment condition they were
assigned, and (2) then asked to rate the severity of all the punishment conditions. This design
choice allows for a more robust assessment of tax evasion punishment severity than if just one
2

part of the survey were conducted. Results reveal what a sample of adult Canadian taxpayers
perceive as punishments for tax evasion that are just right or unjust (i.e., too lenient or too harsh),
providing original evidence of the propriety of a punishment for tax evasion. Notably, a fair
punishment for tax evasion is a fine equal to the amount of taxes evaded, whereas an unfair
punishment is determined to be a fine of $100 (too lenient) or a fine of 200% of the amount of
taxes evaded plus 48 months in jail (too harsh).
In the experiment (study 2), I investigate how observers’ perceptions of retributive justice
information, i.e., public disclosures about tax evasion offences and punishments, are associated
with observers’ tax compliance intentions, and if this relationship can be inadvertently
suppressed. To understand how observers’ punishment perceptions influence compliance
intentions, I rely on insights from fairness heuristic theory. Fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001;
Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp 2001; Lind, Kray & Thompson 2001) suggests that
fairness information can be interpreted differently if accompanied by other fairness-relevant
information. When making fairness judgments, the presence of other fairness-relevant
information can act as a heuristic, or mental shortcut, which allows individuals to reduce their
cognitive load when making fairness judgments. Specifically, individuals will use other fairnessrelevant information, if available, as a heuristic to form a fairness judgment, which in turn may
influence subsequent behaviour. In a retributive tax context, other justice-relevant information
can be the national tax gap. The national tax gap is the difference between taxes that should have
been collected if all taxpayers were fully compliant and taxes that were collected. The CRA has
disclosed information about the tax gap in Canada since 2017. 2
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Some countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia have been disclosing information about
the national tax gap for over 20 years (Australian Taxation Office 2020a; Gov.UK 2020a; International Revenue
Service 2020a).
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Relying on retributive justice and fairness heuristic theory, I conduct an experiment in which
400 Canadian taxpayers respond to a hypothetical tax scenario including both tax evasion
punishment and tax gap disclosures. I manipulate whether or not the tax evasion punishment
disclosure is fair or unfair, and whether or not the tax gap disclosure is present or absent. I also
manipulate the order in which both types of disclosures are presented. Across all conditions,
participants provide their compliance intentions. I predict that when the national tax gap
information precedes the retributive punishment outcome, the effect on observers' compliance
from the retributive justice disclosure will be suppressed. However, when a retributive justice
disclosure precedes the national tax gap, observers will anchor on the retributive justice
disclosure and the justice-relevant disclosure will not significantly alter their established fairness
judgment.
Findings reveal a significant three-way interaction, indicating that the predicted two-way
interaction effects are significantly different from each other. When information about the tax
gap precedes punishment information, the significant influence of punishment outcome on
compliance is suppressed. However, when the punishment information is presented before the
tax gap information the significant main effect of punishment on compliance is not suppressed.
These findings persist even when controlling for significant covariates.
This research makes several contributions to the retributive justice literature and to fairness
heuristic theory. First, I extend existing research on retributive justice and tax compliance. Only
three studies (Farrar & King 2021; Kogler et al. 2015; Mahangila & Holland 2015) examine this
relationship, but fail to consider what constitutes an appropriate punishment, and do not examine
how compliance intentions may be influenced by retributive justice effects of another taxpayers’
misreporting. The proposed research extends the retributive justice and tax compliance literature
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by shedding light on implications of retributive justice and its failure, in which observers
perceive that punishments for tax evasion do not fit the crime. Second, by exploring punishment
perceptions of observers, I more closely examine how society’s outcomes and treatment by the
tax authority (Wenzel 2003) influence compliance intentions of those who learn about these
outcomes. This is important as previous research has identified how individual differences
(Kaplan, Newberry & Reckers 1997; Henderson & Kaplan 2005), social norms (Bobek, Roberts
& Sweeney 2007), fairness perceptions (Farrar, Massey, Osecki & Thorne 2018; Farrar &
Thorne 2016), incongruent personal values (Berger, Guo & King 2020) and tax authority policies
(Farrar & Thorne 2016; Chung and Trivedi 2003; Trivedi, Shehata, & Lynn 2003; Hasseldine,
Hite, James & Toumi 2007) can influence individual tax compliance. However, the current study
aims to provide insights at the societal level which examines how knowledge of society’s
outcomes and treatment by the tax authority influence others’ compliance intentions. Third, I
extend fairness heuristic theory to retributive justice contexts. Fairness heuristic theory was
formulated for organizational contexts and examined in other types of justice including
procedural, distributive and interactional justice (c.f. Lind 2001). However, this research is the
first to extend fairness heuristic theory to a retributive justice context. Furthermore, extending
fairness heuristic theory to a tax context provides an opportunity to explore the moderating
impact of non-organizational justice-relevant information.
This research also makes several contributions to tax policy. My study provides evidence of
the unintended consequences of transparency and public accountability on citizens by showing
that compliance intentions can differ, depending on which type of justice information is initially
presented to taxpayers. Although providing disclosures may be beneficial, as doing so advances
discussions with the public about tax compliance (Government of Canada 2020), the tax
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authority should carefully consider what information it discloses, and when, as there may be
unintended adverse consequences on taxpayers’ compliance intentions.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the theoretical
and empirical literature pertaining to retributive justice, from both a non-tax and tax perspective.
In Chapter 3, I present the methods and findings of the survey (study 1). In Chapter 4, I develop
the hypotheses, and present the methods and findings of the experiment (study 2). The thesis
concludes with Chapter 5.

6

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate a research gap in the tax literature on retributive
justice. Retributive justice refers to the “subjectively appropriate punishment of individuals or
groups who have violated rules, laws, or norms and, thus, are perceived to have committed a
wrongdoing, offence, or transgression” (Wenzel & Okimoto 2016, 238). Examining retributive
justice in a tax context is important as the tax authority imposes punishments on non-compliant
taxpayers. As the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) publishes punishments for non-compliant
taxpayers on its website, the public may perceive the punishment as too lenient, just right, or too
harsh. Yet, empirical research does not show how taxpayers perceive the propriety of
punishments for tax offences. Thus, the impact of punishment disclosures for tax offences on
observers’ is contingent on their retributive justice perceptions.
In the tax literature, researchers tend to investigate procedural justice (e.g., Worsham 1996;
Murphy & Tyler 2008; van Dijke & Verboon 2010; Niesiobędzka & Kołodziej 2020),
distributive justice (e.g., Kim, Evans & Moser 2005; Moser, Evans & Kim 1995; Verboon &
Van Dijke 2007; Wenzel 2002), and interactional justice (e.g., Farrar, Kaplan and Thorne 2019;
Wenzel 2006), and specifically examine how these various justice dimensions influence
taxpayers’ compliance intentions. These justice dimensions are based on the conceptual
understanding of fairness in the organizational behaviour literature (Colquitt 2001). As
retributive justice is not a dimension of organizational justice but appears in criminal justice
literature (Walen 2020), it is largely absent from the tax fairness literature. This situation has
resulted in a paucity of tax research examining how perceptions of retributive justice influence
taxpayers’ behaviour (see Farrar & King 2021; Kogler, Muehlbacher & Kirchler 2015 and
Mahangila & Holland 2015, all discussed subsequently).
7

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I examine retributive justice in general,
while providing a review of the empirical non-tax literature at the three levels of analysis for
retributive justice: individual, group and societal. In Section 2.3, I review the tax literature on
retributive justice. This chapter concludes with Section 2.4.
2.2. Retributive justice
“Retributive justice refers to the subjectively appropriate punishment of individuals or groups
who have violated rules, laws, or norms and, thus, are perceived to have committed a
wrongdoing, offence, or transgression” (Wenzel & Okimoto 2016, 238). The punishments here
can include a variety of outcomes ranging from some type of cost to the offender, or any loss or
suffering imposed. Another party (e.g., tax authority) must impose this punishment unilaterally.
Furthermore, the punishments imposed must be in response to the wrongdoing committed. That
is, the punishment must match or “fit” the wrongdoing. Importantly, punishments do not simply
undo the wrongdoing or restore things to where they were prior to the violation. With retributive
justice, it is essential that punishments be an additional response to the wrongdoing. In a tax
context, repayment of taxes evaded can restore things to where they were prior to a violation;
however, an additional response to this wrongdoing is meted out as a fine and often
imprisonment. Retributive justice can be distinguished from distributive and procedural justice as
it goes beyond simple restitution of the injustice and extends into censure by imposing a
punishment on the rule violator (Wenzel 2003; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather & Platow 2008).
Wenzel (2003) proposes three analytic levels of retributive justice: individual, group and
societal. At the individual level of analysis, people focus on justice of the individual’s personal
outcomes and treatment. At the group level, people focus on the justice of a group’s outcomes
and treatment. At the societal level, people focus on the justice of society’s outcomes and
8

treatment. The societal level is distinguished as it employs macro-justice principles to evaluate
punishments imposed across all individuals, groups and potential recipients of punishment.
I use the three analytic levels described in this section to synthesize the empirical non-tax
literature on retributive justice. The literature reviewed covers the period 2000 to 2020. I search
platforms including ABI Inform and Google Scholar, seeking out research in various streams of
interest including consumer behaviour, organizational behaviour, and law. I searched for
keywords including retributive justice, retributive, retribution, and just deserts.
2.2.1. Retributive justice: Individual level
In this section, I examine non-tax research on retributive justice at the individual level. Recall
that at the individual level of analysis, people focus on justice of the individual’s personal
outcomes and treatment. First, I examine theoretical non-tax research exploring punishment
motives, deservingness and a utilitarian approach. Next, I examine non-tax empirical research
including deservingness and punishment. I then consider future research opportunities.
2.2.1.1. Theoretical non-tax literature
As retributive justice is concerned with the punishment of the offender relative to the offence
committed, researchers have explored arguments concerning what motivates punishment.
Historically, there have always been two mutually incompatible sides of the argument for what
motivates punishment: retributive versus utilitarian motives.
Kant (1788) supports the retributive argument and purports that “perpetrators deserve to be
punished in proportion to their own wickedness” (Carlsmith & Darley 2008, 197). Furthermore,
the punishment imposed should not be concerned with any future consequences of the
punishment, but instead should be allocated in line with what offenders deserve. A key tenet of
the retributive argument is deservingness, or what punishment the offender has earned..
9

Deservingness judgments can be made by assessing the perceived importance of the offence, the
severity of the offence, and the offenders’ degree of responsibility for the offence (Wenzel
2003).
On the contrary, Bentham (1789) supports the utilitarian approach and purports that
punishment decisions must consider not only the harm to the individual, but also the potential
harm or benefits to society. Thus, punishments can be considered moral, as long as there is a
benefit to society, as punishments reduce the likelihood of future offences (Carlsmith & Darley
2008; Wenzel & Okimoto 2016). Utilitarian approaches can focus on specific deterrence,
incapacitation and general deterrence. Specific deterrence is designed to deter the offender from
re-offending in the future. Incapacitation ensures that future crimes are no longer possible, as the
offender is no longer a part of society (as they are incarcerated). With general deterrence,
deserving punishments are designed to punish the offender, while deterring third parties
(observers) from committing a similar crime. These motives for punishment continue to be tested
empirically (see section 2.4.2).
Future theoretical research can consider increasing the specificity of the measures of the
seriousness of a wrong. Additionally, it would also be useful to explore psychological factors
that individuals consider when determining if a punishment is “proportional” to the crime.
2.2.1.2. Empirical non-tax literature
With the development of the theoretical non-tax literature, researchers experimentally
examined retributive versus utilitarian motives. In a vignette study by Darley, Carlsmith, &
Robinson (2000), participants read about various crimes with different degrees of severity. The
authors manipulate crime severity and the likelihood of the perpetrator committing a future
offence, and measure the punishment judgment as the dependent variable. Results show that
10

when making punishment judgments, the crime severity matters more than the likelihood of reoffending. Overall, punishment judgments are made by ensuring that the punishment fits the
crime.
To further understand the retributive-utilitarian theoretical framework, Carlsmith, Darley &
Robinson (2002) experimentally explore punishment motives in general, considering
deservingness versus utilitarian perspectives. Employing vignettes, the authors manipulate the
level of punishment and deterrence, and also measure the punishment judgment as the dependent
variable. The findings reveal that while individuals primarily expect punishment to be motivated
by utilitarian goals, when actually tasked with sentencing wrongdoers for an offence, punishment
judgments appear more motivated by just deserts concerns (vs. deterrence). Thus, similar to
Darley et al. (2000), ensuring that the punishment fits the crime is paramount.
Extending the above study, Carlsmith (2006) further examines whether individuals rely on
information related to retributive or utilitarian perspectives when making punishment judgments.
After receiving some details of a crime, participants are presented with various categories of
information that they can choose to view to obtain more details about the crime. These categories
relate to retributive, deterrent or incapacitation perspectives. The dependent variables include the
number of times participants choose the category, and the order in which participants choose the
category. Results once again provide strong support for the importance of retributive justice as
participants first rely on retributive perspectives, followed by deterrent perspectives, when
making punishment judgments.
As this literature advanced, so did interest in the psychological aspects of how individuals
form punishment decisions. Specifically, research questions explored whether these decisions are
intuitive or carefully reasoned. The intuitive system presents rapid, automatic judgments whereas
11

the carefully reasoned process is more deliberate (Kahneman 2003). In some cases, although
participants quickly report an act as being morally wrong, the reasons for this judgment are not
always clear (Haidt 2001). However, whether participants performed careful reasoning (e.g.,
Carlsmith 2006) or less deliberate reasoning (e.g., Darley et al. 2000), the moral reasoning made
in a punishment decision is typically based on the retributive or just deserts motive (Carlsmith &
Darley 2008). Although the process of these punishment decisions has been examined for
individuals, opportunities remain to examine the implications on observers’ behaviors.
In addition to understanding the processes that individuals undergo for punishment decisions,
understanding how individuals make deservingness judgments is also important. As Wenzel
(2003) suggest, the central question of retributive justice is determining the treatment and degree
of sanction the offender deserves. Feather (1998) developed a deservingness model containing
key constructs of degree of responsibility for an offence, the severity of the offence, punishment
deservingness, and affective reactions. In this model, responsibility for a transgression leads to
punishment deservingness, which in turn leads to affective reactions.
Deservingness judgments can extend to schadenfreude (satisfaction in another’s misfortune)
and cause individuals to experience pleasure when an offender experiences a negative outcome
(Feather, Wenzel & McKee 2013; de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder,
Buck & Fehr 2004). In cases of injustice, an observer may experience a range of emotional
reactions. These can include anger, outrage, disappointment, envy, sadness and even pity. On the
contrary, even though individuals may expect to feel positive affect on receiving justice,
individuals tend not to feel as positive as they thought they would when the actual punishment
occurs (Carlsmith et. al 2008; Gollwitzer & Bushman 2012).

12

The research reviewed above highlights the retributive, deterrent or incapacitation
perspectives of punishment motives for individuals, as well as the importance of retributive
justice outcomes on subsequent behaviour. The studies also explore the effects of individuals’
affective reactions in the punishment decision. The next section explores non-tax theoretical and
empirical findings at the group level.
2.2.2. Retributive justice: Group level
In this section, I examine non-tax research on retributive justice at the group analytic level.
Recall that at the group level, people focus on the justice of a group’s outcomes and treatment.
First, I examine theoretical non-tax research including justice restoration theory, the needs-based
model and some aspects of justice failure. Next, I examine empirical research including topics of
status and power as well as social identity theory. Future research opportunities are considered.
2.2.2.1. Theoretical non-tax literature
Perpetrators who commit offences eligible for punishment violate social expectations as well
as legal requirements of acceptable behaviour. By acting in a manner that not only violates
agreed-upon rules, but also infringes upon the victim’s rights, perpetrators rob victims of
freedom and symbolically elevate themselves above their victims. For instance, a CEO who
defrauds a group of investors robs them of hard-earned money and disempowers them. By
exploiting victims and violating social expectations, victims can feel disempowered, resulting in
the status/power relationship being imbalanced (Miller 2001; Wenzel et al. 2008). Miller (2001)
also theorizes similar concerns from the perspective of the victim’s self-image and identity.
When perpetrators take advantage of victims, victims feel disrespected. By achieving a
retributive justice approach to this violation, the victim attempts to restore their self-image and
identity.
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Overall, since the status/power relationship is out of balance and as victims struggle with
self-image and identity concerns, retributive justice advocates restoring the victim by punishing
the perpetrator. Consequently, retributive responses would aim to restore this balance. To restore
this balance, retributive justice posits that perpetrators must incur some type of cost or suffering,
which is imposed unilaterally (Wenzel et al. 2008; Wenzel & Thielmann 2006). This approach
symbolically lowers the perpetrator and restores the victim’s power, status, self-image and
identity.
Two theoretical perspectives also support the idea of diminution in the victim’s status/power.
These are justice restoration theory and the needs-based model of reconciliation. Justice
restoration theory posits that to regain status/power balance, punishment responses are usually
retributive in nature (Okimoto & Wenzel 2008, Wenzel et al. 2008). The needs-based model of
reconciliation (Shnabel & Nader 2008) also supports this approach to restoring status / power.
These goals of restoring the victim can be achieved through a retributive justice approach. Such
relationships on status/power are also examined empirically and are discussed below.
2.2.2.2. Empirical non-tax literature
Wenzel et al. (2010) examine the status/power relationship by exploring whether individuals
take a retributive justice approach with perpetrators who are in the same ingroup. Specifically,
these authors examine how punishment decisions are influenced when perpetrators and victims
are related to the same ingroup and have a shared identity. The authors find that when there is a
shared identity between perpetrators and victims, a retributive justice approach is not considered
to be fair. Furthermore, a retributive approach is less supported when the group is more
interconnected. In cases of group cohesion, punishments are typically restorative, where justice
is restored by reaffirming values in a bilateral process (Wenzel et al 2008), as opposed to
14

imposing a punishment unilaterally. Restoring justice by reaffirming values, proposes that
punishment serves to re-emphasize the shared values important to a group.
By acting in a way that does not uphold the pre-existing values of the group, a perpetrator
can create uncertainty among existing group members. In this case, other group members may be
unsure about the extent to which other group members share similar values (Wenzel 2002). If it
is suspected that the group values are not in consensus, this may pose a threat to a group
member’s social identity (Wenzel et al. 2008). Thus, when perpetrators and victims are related to
the same ingroup, the purpose of punishment is to reaffirm the values and morals underpinning
the group’s values. Consequently, the message communicated to perpetrators is one of social
disapproval of the wrong action and continued re-emphasis on the group’s values (Okimoto &
Wenzel, 2009; Vidmar, 2000).
In a group setting, the source of the offender’s punishment decision is also important.
Okimoto and Wenzel (2011) examine and find that when a group member’s punishment decision
is made by a third-party ingroup member, this reaffirms the group's commitment to and concern
for that victim. In this way, this punishment reinforces that the victim is still valuable to the other
ingroup members. Subsequently, third-party punishment of the perpetrator actually enhances the
victim’s status within the group. However, this implication of maintained status for the victim is
most effective when the punishment decision is made by an ingroup member with authority.
The research reviewed above highlights how punishment can facilitate the restoration of the
status/power of the victim. However, there may be different punishment motives, especially if
the offender and the victim are from the same ingroup. The next section explores theoretical and
empirical findings at the societal level.
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2.2.3. Retributive justice: Societal level
In this section, I examine research on retributive justice at the societal level. Recall that at the
societal level, people focus on the justice of society’s outcomes and treatment. The societal level
employs macro-justice principles to evaluate punishments imposed across all individuals, groups,
and potential recipients of punishment. In this section, I examine theoretical non-tax research
including perceived fairness, and empirical non-tax research including general deterrence as well
as third party (observer) punishments. Future research opportunities are considered.

2.2.3.1. Theoretical non-tax literature
Potential concerns at the societal level can range from the perceived fairness of the harshness
of punishments for specific perpetrators to offences in general. Theoretically, these concerns
have not been fully explored. Although some anecdotal evidence may exist in public cases where
offenders are not punished appropriately, there remains limited empirical evidence at the societal
level.
Future research at the theoretical level may benefit from developing constructs that consider
both internal (moral) and external (norms) motivations for assessing the seriousness of crimes.
Moreover, developing measures for the consistency of punishment outcomes across all recipients
can be useful in trying to understand the perceived fairness of punishments at the societal level.

2.2.3.2. Empirical non-tax literature
Although empirical non-tax research continues at the individual and group levels, research at
the societal level is scant. I was able to identify one study by (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock & Scott
2004), who consider a social order perspective. When crime is punished appropriately, society
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does not feel threatened. However, when authorities fail to punish crime appropriately, this poses
a threat to society as there appears to be little controls in place to manage crime. To restore this
threat, society can develop a stance where subsequent offenders are punished more harshly to
compensate for their wrongs as well as the wrongs of others that went unpunished. Using a series
of experiments, the authors examined participants’ punishment decisions for crimes of different
severity (moderate versus severe) when the threat to social order was high (versus low). Social
order is manipulated by providing participants with details about the number of perpetrators
convicted for the crime. Results reveal that punishment decisions are more severe in the
conditions where the threat to social order is high, and crime severity is relatively moderate.
Thus, the importance of retributive justice persists, as these punishments are guided by
retributive (versus utilitarian) motives.
Future research at the empirical level can benefit from examining how and when
punishments for crime encourages general deterrence in the society. Moreover, examining the
factors that guide society in making fairness judgments after learning about punishment
outcomes, may also offer practical approaches to managing compliance. With such limited
theoretical and empirical perspectives of retributive justice research at the societal level,
exploring how society (observers) react to the knowledge of punishment outcomes is a fertile
area for new research.
2.3. Retributive justice and tax compliance

Farrar & King (2021), Kogler et al. (2015), and Mahangila & Holland (2015) present studies
examining the relationship between retributive justice and tax compliance. To the best of my
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knowledge, these papers present the only research addressing the association between retributive
justice and tax compliance.
Farrar & King (2021) leverage Feather’s (1998) model of deservingness to understand the
interplay between perceived responsibility for a tax offence and whether the tax offender was
punished when influencing observers’ tax compliance intentions. Using an experiment, the
authors investigate how a tax offender’s successful or unsuccessful conviction influences other
taxpayers’ compliance decisions, particularly when economic and psychological predictions are
competing, as they control for detection and audit likelihood. Overall, results show that
psychological considerations such as perceptions of punishment deservingness and affective
reactions impact compliance decisions, even when controlling for economic factors such as audit
likelihood and detection likelihood. Specifically, observers’ tax compliance intentions are
highest when tax offenders are highly responsible for wrongdoing and are subsequently
punished. This study empirically tests a psychological model of deservingness, and focuses on
the presence or absence of punishment, as opposed to the spectrum of just or unjust punishments
that I examine in my research.
Using a survey distributed to 476 Austrian self-employed taxpayers, Kogler et al. (2015)
examined and found a relationship between retributive justice and tax compliance, only when
perceptions of tax authority power and trust were considered individually. Thus, the researchers
found two indirect relationships between retributive justice and compliance, through trust and
through power, while relying on the slippery slope framework (SSF; Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl
2008). The SSF posits that power and trust are integral components of the tax compliance
decision. However, although the authors tested the SSF, they neither consider retributive justice
failure nor explore punishment propriety.
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In another study, Mahangila & Holland (2015) distributed a survey to 257 business owners in
Tanzania to examine whether or not charging appropriate corporate income tax penalties
positively influence tax compliance. The results demonstrated a direct and positive relationship
between retributive justice and tax compliance intentions, whether the offence was maintaining
incomplete records or failure to pay taxes on time. However, this study examined corporate tax
avoidance, and did not consider the effects of retributive justice failure.
Although these studies provide some insights into the relationship between retributive justice
and tax compliance, the generalizability of the results in these two latter studies is limited, as
respondents were self-employed. Moreover, theoretically, none of these three studies explore the
impact of retributive justice or its failure (i.e. just versus unjust punishment levels) and the
implications for tax compliance. With such limited research and mixed findings, more remains to
be understood about the association between retributive justice and tax compliance.

2.4. Conclusion
This chapter reviewed relevant research on retributive justice in both the non-tax and tax
literature. This literature review highlights two key gaps that the literature has yet to explore: (1)
how taxpayers perceive the propriety of punishment for tax evasion, and (2) how and when
observers’ compliance intentions are influenced by the knowledge of different punishment
outcomes for tax evaders.
Currently, there is no empirical evidence as to how taxpayers – Canadian or otherwise –
perceive the propriety of punishment for tax evasion. Even in the case of known punishment for
tax evasion in Canada, which the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) discloses on its website, the
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public may perceive the punishment as being too lenient, just right, or too harsh. To address this
gap, I will establish societal perceptions of what constitutes appropriate (retributively just) versus
inappropriate (retributive unjust) punishments for tax evasion by observers in society who learn
about others’ punishment outcomes.
Additionally, my research also seeks to address the gap in the societal level of the retributive
justice literature by examining how perceptions of punishment influence the tax compliance
intentions of observers who learn about these outcomes. Examining tax compliance among
observers at the societal level is important as tax evasion costs governments billions and reduces
resources available to tax-funded services (Marriott, 2013; Vidmar, 2000). Furthermore, tax
evasion is not a victimless crime (Button, Lewis & Tapley 2014; Internal Revenue Service
2020b), as taxpayers suffer indirectly from others’ noncompliance by paying a disproportionately
higher share of taxes to fund social programs. When retributive justice disclosures reveal cases
of punishment levels that do not ‘fit’ the crime, this situation could cause unintended effects on
compliance decisions, as observers can learn vicariously about the incompetence of a tax
authority, which can undermine observers’ willingness to comply (Rucker et al. 2004). By
exploring this possibility, I aim to improve understanding of the salutary impact of retributive
justice outcomes on observers’ tax compliance.
To address the first research gap concerning how taxpayers perceive the propriety of
punishment for tax evasion, I develop a survey, which is explained in Chapter 3. To address the
second research gap concerning how and when observers’ compliance intentions are influenced
by the knowledge of different punishment outcomes for tax evaders, I develop an experiment,
which is explained in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3: SURVEY
3.1 Introduction
To empirically investigate the first research gap concerning the propriety of punishment for
tax evasion, I need to understand the spectrum of punishments that can be perceived as just or
unjust. As such, using details of tax offences and the subsequent punishment outcomes imposed
by the tax authority, i.e. retributive justice punishment disclosures, I examine which punishments
are perceived as too lenient, just right and too harsh by a sample of Canadian taxpayers.
In Canada, tax evasion punishments are guided by the Income Tax Act (ITA) and Criminal
Code of Canada.3 In these statutes, punishments for tax evasion consist of a fine and possibly jail
time. Fines can range from a minimum of $100 to a maximum of 200% of the amount of taxes
evaded. Jail time of up to 2 years is usually imposed; however, according to the Criminal Code
of Canada, jail time can be 5 years. The spectrum of punishments explored in this survey are
based on these allowable punishments.
To examine the propriety of punishment for tax evasion, I conduct a two-part complementary
survey on a sample of Canadian taxpayers in which participants were (1) randomly assigned to
one punishment disclosure condition and asked to rate the severity of only the punishment
condition they were assigned, and (2) asked to rate the severity of all the punishment conditions.
In section 3.2 below, I provide an overview of the survey including its design, participants,
procedures and task, independent variables, and dependent variable. I then discuss the findings of
the survey in section 3.3. I conclude with section 3.4.

3

Specifically, ITA Sections 163(2), 238 and 239 and CC section 121(3).
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3.2 Overview of the survey
3.2.1 Design
The tax system allows for three punitive outcomes for tax evasion including fines, jail time
and a combination of jail time and fines. To better understand how taxpayers perceive these
punishments, I vary these three punitive outcomes in a number of different ways. I vary possible
fines 4 different ways, possible jail time in 2 different ways and possible jail time and fines in 4
different ways. In addition, I have a baseline where there is no punishment for tax evasion. In
total, I have 11 different conditions in my survey design.
As mentioned, the survey consists of two parts. In part one, I randomly assign participants to
one punishment condition and ask them to rate the severity of only the punishment condition
they were assigned. Second, in part two, I ask participants to rate the severity of all 11
punishment conditions (excluding the baseline condition). This design choice allows for a more
robust assessment of tax evasion punishment severity than if just one part of the survey were
conducted.4
3.2.2

Participants

Participants were Canadian taxpayers recruited via Prolific. Prolific is an online on-demand
research platform that connects researchers with high quality, vetted participants (Prolific n.d.).
Research reveals that Prolific participants not only provide high quality responses that are
comparable to participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, but also are more diverse (Peer,
Brandimarte, Samat and Acquisti 2017). Although online participants are considered to be highly

4

Another way to collect this data would be to use two separate samples. Thus, punishment severity ratings would be
provided for part one of the survey for one sample, and for part two of the survey in the other sample. For this study,
I decided to use one sample so I can obtain a repeat measure of punishment severity to establish the reliability of this
measure.
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reliable (Farrell, Grenier and Leiby 2017), to further ensure high quality data, I require
participants to have at least a 95% approval rate with successful completion of a minimum of 20
past Prolific studies, as done in previous research using online participants (Collum, Jurney &
Marshall 2021).
To be reasonably representative of the Canadian taxpayer population, participants were
randomly selected according to age (between 25 and 70 inclusive) and gender. These selection
criteria ensured that the sample was both mature and for those for whom tax compliance issues
are likely to be relevant. I requested 30 participants per condition and 331 participants completed
the survey. 5 On average, 39% of the participants are male, are 35.5 (s.d.=9.3) years old, and have
12 years of work experience. 6 There are no significant differences in age, education, work
experience, income or political beliefs across conditions. Details of demographic measures are
provided in Table 1. Participants received £0.65 upon completion of the study. This payment
represents approximately £7.80 per hour, and is regarded as a good rate on Prolific for a survey
expected to take 5 minutes to complete.

5

Sample sizes varied from 28 to 31 per condition. Once the participant quotas for the conditions were met,
participants were rerouted from the survey. Overall, 26 participants did not complete the survey. There is no
demographic information available for these participants.
6
According to Statistics Canada’s age population estimates in 2019
(https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000501), the median age in Canada is 40.8. The median
age of my sample is 33, but includes individuals ages 25 to 70, whereas the Statistics Canada median age includes
all ages. According to Statistics Canada’s income Tables by age group in 2017 (the most recent year with data;
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1110023901), the median income in Canada by age group
was $38,400 (ages 25 to 34), $48,000 (ages 35 to 44), $49,100 (ages 45 to 54), $41,300 (ages 55 to 64), and $28,400
(age 65 and over). When I compared the data segmented similarly by age group, the median score for income
category was 3 ($50,000 - $74,999) for all age categories. The trend regarding income and age in my sample appears
reasonably comparative to that in the broader Canadian population. In my statistical analyses, income is not a
significant covariate. Although age is positively correlated with punishment severity ratings, when included as a
covariate, results do not change significantly.
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3.2.3

Survey Procedures and Task

Participants interested in the study clicked on a link to enter the survey, and were randomly
assigned to one of the 11 conditions. Participants read a hypothetical scenario about a Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) investigation, which reveals that a business owner was found guilty of
evading $10,500 of taxes. In 10 of the punishment disclosure conditions, the tax evader is
subsequently punished, whereas in the baseline condition there is no punishment. To ensure that
the participants read the scenario carefully, I include an attention-check question after the
scenario and before the punishment severity rating question (dependent variable).
Participants must answer this attention-check question correctly before proceeding.
Participants then respond to questions concerning punishment severity. I also include another
attention check question after the punishment severity rating question, 7 followed by measures for
the perceived seriousness of tax evasion and demographic information. Appendix 1 contains the
instrument used in the survey.
3.2.4

Independent variables

The punishment manipulations across conditions are summarized in Table 2. Manipulations
can be classified into four groups: (1) fines only, (2) jail time only, (3) jail time plus fine and (4)
a baseline condition with no mention of punishment. As previously mentioned, I vary possible
fines 4 different ways, possible jail time in 2 different ways and vary possible jail time and fines
in 4 different ways, resulting in 10 different manipulations and one baseline condition.

7

The first attention check question is: (1) After the CRA’s investigation, what happened to the taxpayer? The
participants must answer this question correctly before they can proceed. Among participants, 2.7% (or 9) of them
fail this attention check question once. The second attention check question was embedded among four other rankbased questions. Participants are instructed to select a rating of 5 on a scale ranging from 1 to 11. Among
participants, 0.6% (or 2) of them fail the attention check question. Statistical inferences remain unchanged after
excluding responses for participants who failed the first attention check question at least once, and participants who
failed the second attention check question.
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To ensure that the punishment manipulations are realistic, the choice of punishments used in
the survey is guided by the Income Tax Act (ITA) and Criminal Code of Canada.8 In these
statutes, punishments for tax evasion consist of a fine and possibly jail time. Fines can range
from a minimum of $100 to a maximum of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded. Consequently, I
manipulate fines on the lower end of the range (at $100), the higher end of the range (200% of
taxes evaded), and in-between (50% and 100% of taxes evaded, respectively). Thus, the fines
imposed across the conditions represent a range of fines permitted by the ITA. Second, jail time
of up to 2 years is usually imposed; however, according to the Criminal Code of Canada, jail
time can be 5 years. Although it is unlikely that jail time would be imposed without a fine, I
isolate the jail time manipulation to better understand how each type of punishment is perceived
in terms of its severity. Consequently, I manipulate jail time around the midpoint of the
allowable range (48 months) and within the usual range of jail time imposed (15 months).
Finally, as punishments for tax evasion can consist of both fines and jail time, I also include
several conditions, which manipulate jail time plus a fine. These punishment manipulations
combine fines around the midpoint and higher end of the range, with the allowable jail time
amounts specified above. Although there may be multiple ways to vary fines and jail time, the
manipulations used in this study are selected with the goal of representing what would
reasonably occur. Thus, I aim to explore variations that are realistic while avoiding an overly
exhaustive list of variations. For instance, although a fine of $100 and jail time of 15 months is a
possible variation, it is not realistic, as such a low fine would never be imposed with jail time.
Recall that the scenario in the survey reveals that a business owner evaded $10,500 of taxes.
This amount was chosen as people usually perceive $10,000 as a relatively significant amount

8

Specifically, ITA Sections 163(2), 238 and 239 and CC section 121(3).
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when unethical behaviour is involved (Ariely 2008). To ensure that participants also have similar
views on the amount evaded, participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they consider
$10,500 as a significant amount of taxes to evade. Thus, participants are asked if they agree or
disagree with the statement that “$10,500 is a significant amount of taxes to evade”, where 1 =
strongly disagree and 11 = strongly agree. The mean score for all respondents is 7/11, which is
above the midpoint of the scale and reveals that this amount was perceived as a relatively
significant amount of taxes to evade. Across conditions, the means ranged from 6.13/11 to
7.23/11. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirms that the means did not vary significantly
across conditions (F(10,320)=37.25, p=0.93). 9
3.2.5

Dependent variable
In response to the tax evasion scenario, participants are asked to provide a punishment

severity rating for the punishment imposed on the tax evader. Participants provide punishment
severity ratings for both part one and part two of the survey. In the first part of the survey where
participants were randomly assigned to one punishment disclosure condition, participants are
asked: (1) to rate the punishment on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 = too lenient and 11 = too
harsh; and (2) to respond to an open-ended question about an appropriate punishment for the tax
evasion committed. In the second part of the survey where participants were asked to rate the
severity of all the punishment conditions, participants are asked to rate all of the punishments.
These punishments are presented on the same screen and are randomized in order to reduce the
effects of order bias.

9

Participant responses to the extent to which $10,500 is considered a significant amount of taxes to evade, are
significantly negatively correlated with income (-.11) and this correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Thus, participants who had a lower (higher) income perceived the evasion of $10,500 in taxes as more (less) serious.
The extent to which $10,500 is considered a significant amount of taxes to evade was not correlated with any other
demographic variables.
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3.2.6

Control variables

Participants provided details of demographic variables including gender, age, work
experience, education, income, and political beliefs. I also asked participants if they considered
tax evasion a serious crime. As shown in the correlation analysis in Table 3, there are three
variables that significantly correlate with punishment severity ratings: age, work experience, and
tax evasion seriousness. As a result, these variables were included as covariates, but, as the
results do not change significantly when they are included, I present the results without
covariates. Inspecting the significant correlations reveals that generally, older (younger)
participants with more (less) work experience rate the punishment that the tax evader received as
harsh (lenient). Moreover, participants who consider tax evasion a serious crime rate punishment
severity as less harsh. Thus, these participants believe that tax evaders should be punished more
harshly. 10
3.3 Results
As I conducted a two-part complementary survey, the results are presented for part one of the
survey, where participants rate the severity of only the punishment condition they were assigned,
followed by part two of the survey, where participants were asked to rate the severity of all the
punishment conditions.

10

As the data is ordinal, a Kendall's tau-b non-parametric correlation was also run to determine the relationship
between punishment severity ratings and gender, age, work experience, education, income, political beliefs, and tax
evasion seriousness. Kendall’s correlation was chosen as it is a more conservative test and is better at handling tied
ranks (Field 2013). Similarly, this test reveals a strong, positive correlation between punishment severity ratings and
work experience (τb = .089, p =0.05) and a strong, negative correlation between punishment severity ratings and tax
evasion seriousness (τb = -.104, p =0.05). However, this test did not reveal a significant correlation between
punishment severity ratings and age, although the relationship was in the same direction (τb = .073).
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3.3.1 Part One: punishment severity ratings of only the punishment condition assigned
To empirically determine the propriety of punishment for tax evasion, I first examine the
mean scores of each punishment condition to determine which conditions are too lenient, just
right, and too harsh. Next, I conduct statistical analysis to determine the extent to which the
punishment conditions are perceived as significantly different from each other.
3.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all punishment conditions are presented in Table 4 and graphically
depicted in Figure 1A. The purpose of this analysis is to analyze the punishment severity ratings
to identify which punishment condition(s) are relatively lenient, just right, and harsh. As
expected, a punishment with a fine of $100 is rated as most lenient (m=2.94/11, s.d.=2.44)
whereas a punishment with the highest fine and longest jail term ($21,000 and 48 months) is
rated as most harsh (m=9.10/11, s.d.=1.63).
A punishment severity rating near the midpoint of the scale (6/11) suggests that the specific
punishment is just right. Respondents rated the punishment condition in which the fine was
100% of the amount of taxes evaded as 5.97/11 (s.d.=1.77), which is almost exactly the midpoint
of 6/11. Thus, a preliminary inspection of means reveals that the most lenient condition is a
nominal fine of $100; the just right condition is a fine equal to 100% of the amount of taxes
evaded; and the most harsh condition is a combination of a stiff fine (200% of the amount of
taxes evaded) and a relatively long jail term (48 months). 11

11

Unexpectedly, the no punishment/baseline condition had a higher mean (m=3.69; s.d.=1.96) than the punishment
perceived as too lenient. Also, the punishment severity ratings between these two conditions were not significantly
different. This could suggest that punishing too leniently may be perceived worse than not punishing at all.
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3.3.1.2 Non-parametric analysis
Next, to further determine the extent to which the punishment severity ratings are perceived
as significantly different from each other, I conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric
alternative to analysis of variance (ANOVA). The Kruskal-Wallis test can confirm that there are
significant differences in punishment severity ratings across all the conditions. 12 Following this, I
conduct a series of between-means comparisons using the Mann-Whitney test. The MannWhitney test will allow me to better understand the differences across punishment conditions. To
adjust for the increased risk of type 1 errors when making multiple between-means comparisons,
I use the Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction. As the Bonferroni method can be
conservative and may increase the probability of type 2 errors, I also use the Holm-Bonferroni
method, which offers a more powerful correction (Glen 2016). 13
I compare the means of punishment conditions with fines only, jail time only and jail time
plus fines. Furthermore, to explore the additive effects of jail time on a fine, I then compare
select means of punishments with a fine only and a fine plus jail time. These results are discussed
below.
3.3.1.3 Analysis across conditions

First, I conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test to determine if there are significant differences in
punishment severity ratings. If this test statistic is significant, it indicates that there are

12

I use non-parametric tests as the distribution is non-normal. Statistical tests reveal that the symmetry of the
distribution is negatively skewed (skewness=-.34) and the distribution is relatively flat (kurtosis=-.74). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is significant at the p<0.01 level, indicating a violation of normality. Visual
inspection of the histogram, Q-Q plot, Detrended Q-Q plot and boxplot also reveals that the distributions is nonnormal (Field 2013; Pallant 2010).
13
The Bonferroni correction p value = ((0.05/15)~ p<0.01). The Bonferroni-Holm correction p value = (0.05)/(151+1)~ p<0.01).
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significant differences. The test statistic (χ² (10)=151.23) is significant (p <0.01). Further
analysis reveals that a fine of $100 has the lowest mean of 2.94/11 (mean rank=53.61,
median=2), and a fine of $21,000 plus jail time of 48 months has the highest mean of 9.10/11
(mean rank=239.13, median=9.50). Empirical evidence as to what constitutes a punishment that
is just right also suggests a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded which has a mean of
5.97/11 (mean rank=125.97, median=6) , which is almost exactly the midpoint of 6/11. Figure 2
graphically depicts the mean ranks for these punishment severity ratings. The mean ranks also
offer a visual depiction of the additive effects of punishments.
To further examine how the punishments are statistically different from one another, I
conduct follow-up post-hoc analyses using Mann-Whitney tests for the three conditions of
greatest interest: too lenient, just right and too harsh. As previously discussed, to control for the
increased risk of errors when making multiple mean comparisons, I apply a Bonferroni
correction and the Holm-Bonferroni method. The results of these tests are discussed below.
3.3.1.4 Too lenient versus Just right
In the too lenient condition, tax evaders paid a fine of $100, whereas in the just right
condition tax evaders paid a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded. Results of the MannWhitney test reveal a significant difference between the too lenient and just right conditions (Z=4.87, p<0.01).
3.3.1.5 Just Right versus Too harsh
In the just right condition, tax evaders paid a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded,
whereas in the too harsh condition tax evaders paid a fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded

30

plus 48 months in jail. Results of the Mann-Whitney test reveal a significant difference between
the just right and too harsh conditions (Z=-6.20, p<0.01). 14
3.3.1.6 Qualitative analysis of the Just Right condition
To further validate the punishment imposed in the just right condition, participants were also
asked a self-reported measure to determine the appropriate punishment for evading $10,500 in
taxes. Analysis of this question reveals that participants (N=331) agree that a fine of 100% of the
taxes evaded is appropriate as the average fine proposed was $11,000. A closer look at amounts
most frequently listed by participants reveals that 25% (n=80) of the participants listed either
$10,000 or $10,500 as a fine amount that is just right. Also, 20% (n=63) listed either $5,000 or
$5,250 as a fine amount that is just right. These results are graphically depicted in Figure 3. 15
Overall, these results provide additional empirical support that the three punishment
conditions (too lenient, just right and too harsh) are significantly different. Consequently, these
punishment conditions will be considered for the subsequent experiment (Study 2). Next, I
conduct a series of between-mean comparisons to better understand the differences of the
variations of punishment types used across punishment conditions. Thus, I compare the
perceived differences of the variations of fine only, jail time only and fine plus jail time
punishments using Mann-Whitney tests.

14

In the too lenient condition, tax evaders paid a fine of $100, whereas, in the too harsh condition tax evaders paid a
fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded plus 48 months in jail. Results reveal a significant difference between
the too lenient and too harsh conditions (Z=-6.20, p<0.01).
15

Participants were also asked to suggest a jail time appropriate for evading $10,500 in taxes. The jail time
suggested by participants was nominal (mean=5 months), with 49% of participants suggesting no jail time and
another 7% suggesting only 1 month of jail time. Some participants strongly opposed jail time, commenting that jail
time is ‘too costly for taxpayers’, is an ‘overreaction’ and is ‘extreme’. Thus, I decided to rely on the punishment of
100% of the amount of taxes evaded as a punishment that is just right; established in part one of the survey.
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3.3.1.7 Fine-only conditions
First, I examine the conditions where fines are imposed. I compare the conditions with fines
of 50%, 100%, and 200% of the amount of taxes evaded and a fine of $100. The Mann-Whitney
test (not tabulated) yields no significant differences in perceived severity of a fine of 200% of the
amount of taxes evaded and a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded (U=383.5, z=-1.01,
p=0.16, r=0.13). Similarly, there is no significant difference in perceived severity of a fine of
100% of the amount of taxes evaded and a fine of 50% of the amount of taxes evaded (U=399,
z=-0.33, p=0.37, r=0.04). In contrast, the perceived severity of a fine of 50% of the amount of
taxes evaded (Median=6.00, n=28) and a fine of $100 (Median=2.00, n=31) differ significantly
(U=197.5, z=-3.65, p<0.01, r=0.47). Overall, statistically significant differences are observed
between the minimum fine of $100 and the conditions with higher fines. A closer look at the
results suggests that a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded is rated closest to the midpoint of the scale (m=5.97/11). Consistent with the additional evidence supporting the just right
punishment in subsection 3.3.1.6 above, this provides further empirical evidence that taxpayers
perceive an appropriate punishment for tax evasion as a fine equal to 100% of the amount of
taxes evaded.
3.3.1.8 Jail-time only Conditions
Next, I examine the conditions where jail time is imposed. As jail time of up to 60 months
can be imposed by the CRA, I examine conditions with jail time of 15 months and 48 months to
provide several comparison points pertaining to sentence length. Participants did not perceive a
statistically significant difference between the harshness of 15 months and 48 months of jail time
and rated them similarly (U=443, z=-0.33, p=0.37, r= -0.04). Nonetheless, when jail time is
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imposed, participants perceive punishments as being relatively harsh, with means of 8.33/11 and
8.35/11, respectively.
3.3.1.9 Jail time plus fine Conditions
Next, I compare the differences in punishment severity ratings when fines are held constant
but jail time is varied. The Mann-Whitney test reveals significant differences between a fine of
200% of the amount of taxes evaded plus 15 months of jail time and a fine of 200% of the
amount of taxes evaded plus 48 months of jail time (U=312.5, z=-1.89, p=0.03, r=0.13).
Therefore, increasing jail time from 15 months to 48 months results in a slight increase in
perceptions of punishment severity, when combined with a fine of 200% of the amount of taxes
evaded. When a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded is imposed, increasing jail time
from 15 months to 48 months does not reveal a significant difference in punishment severity
ratings (U=426.5, z=-0.78, p=0.22, r=0.10). Thus, imposing jail time in varying amounts
maintains perceptions of punishment harshness. Moreover, all conditions with jail time and fines
imposed have means which exceed 8/11.

3.3.1.10 Fine-only versus Fine and Jail Time Conditions16
To further explore the additive effect of jail time on a fine, I compare the fine of 200% of the
amount of taxes evaded (m=6.53/11) to the fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded plus jail
time of 15 months (m=8.17/11). Results show a significant difference between the punishment
severity ratings of these punishments when jail time is added (U=248.5, z=-2.86, p<0.01,

16

These specific comparisons were chosen in order to isolate the additive effect of jail time on a fine. Thus,
conditions were selected where the fine amount could be held constant, while varying the jail time. This resulted in 4
comparisons as analyzed below.
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r=0.37). In addition, I compare the fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded (m=6.53/11) to
the fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded plus jail time of 48 months (m=9.10/11). Results
also show a significant difference between the punishment severity ratings of these punishments
(U=171.5, z=-4.16, p<0.01, r=0.54). Overall, when jail time of 15 months or 48 months is added
to a fine of 200% of the taxes evaded, the punishment is perceived as more severe.
Finally, I compare the fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded (m=5.97/11) to the fine of
100% of the amount of taxes evaded plus jail time of 15 months (m=8.71/11). Results of the
Mann-Whitney test (not tabulated) show a significant difference between the punishment
severity ratings of these punishments with the added jail time (U=132.5, z=-4.87, p<0.01,
r=0.62). Similarly, I find a statistically significant difference (U=175, z=-4.24, p<0.01, r=0.54) in
punishment severity ratings between a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded (m=5.97/11)
and a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded plus jail time of 48 months (m=8.39/11).
Overall, the additive effect of jail time increases perceptions of punishment severity.

3.3.2 Part Two: punishment severity ratings of all punishment conditions
Recall that in the first part of the survey, participants rate the severity of only the punishment
condition they were assigned. In the second part of the survey, participants were asked to rate the
severity of all the punishment conditions. To provide additional empirical support for the
propriety of punishment for tax evasion, in part two of the survey I analyze punishment severity
ratings when all punishment conditions are presented to participants. Thus, in part two of the
survey, participants are presented with all of the different punishments for evading $10,500 in
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taxes. 17 These punishments are presented on the same screen and are randomized in order to
reduce the effects of order bias. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the punishment
severity ratings in part one of the survey and part two of the survey follow similar patterns. If the
severity ratings follow similar patterns, participants will identify the same punishment
condition(s) as relatively lenient, just right, and harsh. Descriptive statistics for all punishment
conditions are presented in Table 4 and graphically depicted in Figure 1B.
As in part one of the survey, a punishment with a fine of $100 is rated as most lenient (too
lenient; m=1.58/11, s.d.=2.53) whereas a punishment with the highest fine and longest jail term
($21,000 and 48 months) is rated as most harsh (too harsh; m=9.16/11, s.d.=1.87). Similarly, in
part two of the survey, respondents rated the punishment condition in which the fine was 100%
of the amount of taxes evaded as 5.45/11 (s.d.=2.05), which is close to the midpoint of 6/11.
Thus, the results of both parts of the survey converge.
To provide additional analysis of the differences in the means for the two parts of the survey,
I conduct non-parametric t-tests. Specifically, I use the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, as the two
samples are not independent. However, with large differences in sample sizes for between- and
within-participant responses, this influences the feasibility of this test due to many missing pairs.
Consequently, I compare the means of all responses across the two parts of the survey. Results
reveal that there is not a significant difference between the means, z=-1.172, p=0.24 with a small
effect size (r=0.06). Overall, the mean ratings follow similar patterns when punishments are rated

17

If a participant is randomly assigned to a condition in the first part of the survey, the response to this punishment
severity rating is removed in the analysis of the second part of the survey. For instance, if a participant is assigned to
the condition with a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded, the response to this punishment severity rating is
removed in the second part of the survey, where participants rate all of the punishments. This approach aims to
minimize the possibility that a participant’s punishment severity rating in the second part of the survey, is influenced
by the punishment severity rating provided in the first part of the survey, where participants were randomly assigned
to conditions with this single punishment.
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by participants randomly assigned to one punishment condition and by participants rating the
severity of all punishment conditions.

3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
3.3.3.1 Punishment severity ratings: Part One versus Part Two
It is possible that participants’ responses in the first part of the survey may change when
asked to rate all punishments in the second part of the survey. This change can occur as
participant’s punishment severity perceptions may be influenced if they make comparisons with
all other punishments. For instance, a participant who rated the punishment severity of a fine of
$21,000 in part one of the survey may change the punishment severity rating when asked to rate
this same fine of $21,000 in the second part of the survey. To examine any changes in
participants’ punishment severity ratings for the punishment displayed by itself (part one) and
the same punishment displayed among other punishments (part two), I first conduct Friedman’s
analysis of variance, followed by a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. The Friedman’s test is appropriate
as I used the same sample of participants to measure the punishment severity ratings for both
parts of the survey. This test is the non-parametric alternative to the one-way repeated measure
analysis of variance and provides mean ranks for punishment severity ratings. Following up with
a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test tests allows me to more closely examine the changes in punishment
severity ratings between part one and part two as it provides results of a paired samples t-test
with repeated measures (Field 2013; Pallant 2010). In this test, not having a statistically
significant difference in punishment severity ratings provided across the two parts of the survey
provide additional evidence of the reliability of the punishment severity ratings.
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Friedman’s analysis of variance reveals a statistically significant difference in punishment
severity ratings provided in part one and part two of the survey (χ²(1) = 36.54, p <0.01).
Although the mean ranks show a decrease in punishment severity ratings from part one (mean
rank=1.66) to part two (mean rank=1.34), the median values show an increase in punishment
severity ratings from part one (median=7.00) to part two (median=8.00). Having established that
there are significant differences in the punishment severity ratings provided across the two parts
of the survey, I further investigate where these differences lie. To do this I conduct post-hoc tests
using a series of Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests with Bonferroni correction. As the Bonferroni
method can be conservative and may increase the probability of type 2 errors, I also use the
Holm-Bonferroni method, which offers a more powerful correction (Glen 2016). 18
Results of the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test reveal that there is not a statistically significant
difference in seven of the punishment severity ratings when examining responses in part one and
part two. A difference that is not statistically significant reveals that punishment severity ratings
are consistent when rated in part one and part two of the survey. However, there is a statistically
significant reduction in punishment severity ratings for three punishments: (1) jail time of 15
months; z=-2.05, p=0.04, (2) a fine of 50% of the amount of the taxes evaded; z=-2.89, p<0.01
and (3) a fine of $100; z=-2.03, p=0.04. Thus, participants rated these punishments as more
lenient in the second part of the survey. It is possible that participants rated jail time of 15
months as more lenient in the second part of the survey as they made comparisons with jail time
of 48 months, which was rated as more severe. Despite this change in the punishment severity
rating for jail time of 15 months, all punishments including jail time had higher punishment

18

The Bonferroni correction p value = ((0.05/10)~ p<0.01). The Bonferroni-Holm correction p value = (0.05)/(101+1)~ p<0.01).
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severity ratings than punishments with fines only. For the fine of 50% of the amount of the taxes
evaded it is likely that participants made comparisons with other fine amounts to make changes
to the severity rating for this punishment. Additionally, although the punishment severity of a
fine of $100 was rated as significantly more lenient, this rating is in the expected direction and
supports perceptions of a fine of $100 being too lenient. Table 5 displays the means of the
punishment severity ratings that participants provide when rating the same punishment both in
the first part and the second part of the survey. This table also highlights the z-values and
significance values for all punishment severity ratings being compared. Figure 4 graphically
depicts these means. 19 Overall, these results provide additional evidence of the reliability of the
punishment severity ratings, as the ratings remain relatively stable between part one and part
two.
3.3.3.2 Regression Analysis
Next, I conduct regression analysis to further explore the extent to which punishment
severity ratings change when considering the amount of the fine, length of jail time, or a
combination of fine and jail time. I use the punishment severity rating as the dependent variable,
and the fine conditions, jail time conditions and the interaction term between the fine and jail
time as the independent variables. The fine and jail time are included as continuous variables in
this analysis. Results in Table 6, reveal that jail time makes the strongest statistically significant
unique contribution to explaining punishment severity (β = 0.31, p < 0.01). This provides

19

Figure 4 is different from Figures 1A and 1B as it examines a repeat measure of the punishment severity rating.
Particularly, I assess the reliability of the punishment severity ratings by comparing the rating of the same
punishment in both part one and part two of the survey. That is, punishments that are rated both in part one and in
part two are compared. Thus, the measures for the baseline/ no punishment condition are not included as this was
only rated in part one of the survey.
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additional support that when jail time is imposed, punishments are perceived as harsh. 20

3.4 Conclusion
This survey considered a range of plausible punishments for tax evasion and investigated
how a sample of Canadian taxpayers perceive the severity of these punishments. In so doing, I
provide exploratory empirical evidence of the appropriateness of a punishment for tax evasion.
Specifically, an appropriate punishment is perceived to be a fine equal to the amount of taxes
evaded. Tax evasion punishments that are not appropriate (i.e., too lenient or too harsh) are
determined to be a fine of $100 (too lenient) and a fine of 200% of the amount of taxes evaded
plus 48 months in jail (too harsh). These results will provide guidance for the subsequent
experiment (Study 2).

20

Visual inspection of the regression scatterplot reveals that data shows heteroscedasticity. Coefficients should be
interpreted with caution (Glen 2015).
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT
4.1 Introduction
Recall that a second research gap I identified is that the retributive justice literature has yet to
examine how observers’ compliance intentions are influenced by the knowledge of different
punishment outcomes for tax evaders. To address this gap, in this chapter, I develop and analyze
an experiment to investigate how observers’ fairness perceptions of tax evasion punishments
influence observers’ tax compliance intentions. Specifically, I examine how observers’ tax
compliance intentions are jointly influenced by a retributive outcome (fair versus unfair) and a
contextual moderator variable, which is additional justice-relevant information (national tax gap
present versus absent).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.3
presents the research method including an overview of the experimental design, participants,
experimental procedures and task, independent variables, and dependent variable. Section 4.4,
provides the results of the experiment. This chapter concludes with section 4.5.

4.2 Development of hypotheses
4.2.1 Retributive justice and tax compliance intentions
Relying on retributive justice literature, I expect a main effect of punishment outcome
fairness on observers’ tax compliance intentions, such that tax compliance intentions will
increase if the punishment is fair and decrease if the punishment is unfair. When retributive
justice disclosure is published by the tax authority, cases of unfair punishment outcomes can
cause unintended effects on compliance decisions. As observers learn vicariously about the
incompetence of a tax authority, observers’ compliance can be undermined (Rucker, Polifroni,
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Tetlock & Scott 2004). However, when observers perceive another taxpayers’ punishment as
fair, they too develop perceptions of fairness in the tax system, and a common understanding is
established that offenders will be punished appropriately and there will be retributive justice,
which signals the competence of the tax authority and asserts its right to be obeyed (Tyler 2000).
Evidence from the survey in chapter 3 reveals that, in a tax context, punishment outcomes
can be perceived as too lenient, just right or too harsh. When a punishment outcome is perceived
as just right, the punishment outcome “fits the crime” and retributive justice occurs, i.e., the
punishment outcome is perceived as fair. However, when the punishment imposed on tax
offenders does not match or align with the wrongdoing committed, this punishment outcome can
be perceived as either too lenient or too harsh. In either situation there is a retributive justice
failure as both of these outcomes are perceived as unfair.
In the context of this study, it is realistic for the tax authority to impose a punishment that is
perceived as too lenient but not too harsh, for a few reasons. First, the survey in chapter 3 reveals
that the additive effect of jail time increases perceptions of punishment severity. Although the
Criminal Code of Canada allows the tax authority to impose jail time of 48 months, the average
jail time imposed is only 22 months (Davidson 2015). As such, it is unlikely that jail time would
be imposed for evading $10,500 in taxes, a conclusion borne out by Okafor & Farrar (2021),
who document empirically using a 10-year sample of 2,570 Canadian conviction notices for tax
crimes that the average incarceration period is 17 months and that the mean unreported income
amount is $89,978. Indeed, there is evidence that tax evaders are punished too leniently, such as
in the Canadian KPMG-Isle of Man tax scandal (Cashore 2015), where participants of this
negligent offshore scheme were never fined and never jailed. In other global tax schemes like the
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Panama papers, approximately 900 Canadians were identified in this offshore scheme, but no
one was ever punished for possible wrongdoing and no criminal charges were laid. 21
Second, when jail time is imposed, it is usually reserved for more egregious forms of tax
non-compliance (Davidson 2015). In the context of this study, $10,500 of evasion is perceived as
a relatively significant amount of taxes to evade, consistent with other non-tax literature about
offence magnitude (e.g., Ariely 2008). However, more egregious forms of non-compliance can
be hundreds of thousands of dollars. As such, to increase realism, in my study when a
punishment is too lenient, I refer to it as unfair and when a punishment is just right, I refer to it as
fair. Overall, I predict a main effect of punishment outcome fairness on observers’ tax
compliance intentions, such that tax compliance intentions will increase if the punishment is fair
and decrease if the punishment is unfair. My expectation is stated formally below.

HYPOTHESIS 1: There is a positive (negative) association between a fair (unfair)
punishment outcome and observers’ tax compliance.

4.2.2 Fairness heuristic theory and tax compliance intentions

Fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp 2001; Lind, Kray
& Thompson 2001) sheds light on how justice judgments are formed and why they influence
individuals’ subsequent behaviour. The theory suggests that fairness information can be
interpreted differently if accompanied by other fairness-relevant information. When making
fairness judgments, the presence of other fairness-relevant information can act as a heuristic, or
mental shortcut. Using other fairness-relevant information as a heuristic allows individuals to
reduce their cognitive load when making fairness judgments. Specifically, individuals will use
21

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/panama-papers-cra-tax-recovered-charges-1.5082058
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other justice-relevant information, if available, as a heuristic to form a fairness judgment, which
in turn influences subsequent behaviour. 22
Fairness heuristic theory was formulated for procedural, distributive and interactional justice
(c.f. Lind 2001) and has not yet been extended to retributive justice contexts. Extending fairness
heuristic theory to a retributive justice setting is reasonable because fairness heuristic theory
examines fairness and how individuals apply fairness perceptions in social situations. Since
fairness is a “social heuristic to determine how a person approaches social…situations” (Lind
2001: 69), it is reasonable to conclude that retributive justice will impact tax-related behaviour,
which is a social behaviour in that taxes fund social programs.
Empirical evidence reveals that fairness is important when individuals face uncertainty (Van
den Bos & Lind 2002). Furthermore, individuals are more likely to form fairness judgments by
relying on initial fairness information, and if information concerning others’ outcomes is not
available, individuals are willing to rely on other relevant information to form fairness judgments
(Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt & Wilke 1997). Specific to procedural fairness, when procedural
information is presented first, individuals’ procedural fairness judgments tend to be stronger than
when procedural fairness information is preceded by other relevant information (Van den Bos,
Vermunt & Wilke 1997).
Fairness heuristic theory posits that if presented with multiple information sources, one
specifically about fairness and the other related to fairness, the fairness-relevant information is
expected to moderate the impact of fairness information on observers. This moderation effect is
further impacted by the sequence in which the fairness information is processed relative to the

22

This theory posits a two-phase process: the judgment phase and the use phase. In the judgment phase, fairness
information is received and processed. In the use phase, the fairness information influences behaviours. In the use
phase, the fairness heuristic is established and acts as an anchor to interpret justice-relevant information.
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fairness-relevant information. On the one hand, if the fairness information is presented before the
fairness-relevant information, fairness heuristic theory predicts that individuals will anchor on
the fairness information and use it as a heuristic or mental shortcut. In this setting, fairness
judgments will be formed quickly with the fairness information exercising the greatest influence
on feelings of overall fairness (cf., Lind 2001: 71). Using the fairness information as a heuristic
to form rapid fairness judgments reduces individuals’ cognitive load when making fairness
judgments in the face of multiple fairness information. Once this fairness judgment is formed
and the fairness heuristic is established, individuals will develop cognitive resistance to adjusting
their fairness interpretation, even when additional fairness-relevant information is subsequently
presented. Thus, additional fairness-relevant information is not expected to alter observers’
initial fairness perceptions.
On the other hand, if the fairness-relevant information is presented before the fairness
information, fairness heuristic theory predicts that individuals will anchor on the fairnessrelevant information. Even after specific fairness information is presented, it will be interpreted
in light of the initial fairness-relevant information. As such, when there is fairness information
and fairness-relevant information, if the fairness-relevant information initially presented has a
strong impact on observers’ judgments, the impact of subsequent fairness information on an
observer could be suppressed. In contrast, the impact of fairness information would not be
suppressed if it was presented before fairness-relevant information.
Overall, fairness heuristic theory predicts that “…early fairness judgments will be especially
potent” (Lind 2001: 73). Thus, depending on the sequencing of the fairness information relative
to the fairness-relevant information, different fairness judgments will be established.
Importantly, once a general fairness judgment is established, “…it will be assumed to be
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accurate, and any incoming information relevant to…fairness…will be reinterpreted and
assimilated to be congruent with the existing general fairness judgment" (Lind 2001: 70). Thus,
the sequencing of the information matters to individuals’ subsequent fairness judgments and
subsequent behaviours. Fairness heuristic theory predicts that individuals' fairness perceptions
could be altered by first processing fairness-relevant information, but individuals’ fairness
perceptions would not be altered by subsequently processing fairness-relevant information.
In a tax context, retributive justice information, i.e., public disclosures about tax evasion
offences and punishments, provide an opportunity for observers to establish fairness judgments
concerning whether retributive justice outcomes are fair (just right) or unfair (too lenient).
However, there may be other justice-relevant information that, if available, could allow
observers to potentially modify their interpretation of the fairness of the retributive justice
information. An example of other justice-relevant information in a retributive tax context is the
national tax gap.
The national tax gap is the difference between taxes that should have been collected if all
taxpayers were fully compliant and taxes that were collected. In 2017, the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA) released the first-ever estimate of the personal tax gap in Canada, which was $8.7
billion (Government of Canada 2020). This amount is updated annually and is publicly
disclosed. Increasing retributive justice disclosures and other justice-relevant disclosures, like the
tax gap, may be beneficial as doing so advances discussions with the public about tax
compliance (Government of Canada 2020). However, it is possible that the salutary effect of
retributive justice disclosures may be impacted by other justice-relevant disclosures about the
scope of national tax evasion.
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On the one hand, the salutary effect of retributive justice disclosures could be enhanced by
the presence of another justice-relevant disclosure – the national tax gap – as it could signal to
observers that tax evasion is a serious problem for which the tax authority is making concerted
efforts to combat. On the other hand, the salutary effect of a retributive justice disclosure could
be diminished by the presence of another justice-relevant disclosure if observers can assess the
scope of the tax evasion problem and ascertain that one tax conviction may be ineffective at
reducing national tax evasion. Furthermore, if an observer learns about a retributive justice
disclosure and another justice-relevant disclosure, like the size of the national tax gap, the
observer might interpret the fairness of the retributive justice disclosure differently than if they
did not know about the justice-relevant disclosure.
Using insights from fairness heuristic theory, I predict that when the national tax gap
information (justice-relevant disclosure) precedes the retributive punishment outcome, the effect
on observers' compliance from a retributive justice disclosure will be suppressed. 23 That is, when
the justice-relevant disclosure is used to establish fairness judgments, subsequent retributive
justice judgments have little effect on the evaluations of punishment outcomes; thus, observers
should not differentiate between an unfair versus fair punishment.
However, when a retributive justice disclosure precedes the national tax gap, observers will
anchor on the retributive justice disclosure and the justice-relevant disclosure will not
significantly alter their established fairness judgment. In this situation, the presence of the
justice-relevant disclosure will not change observers’ interpretation of the retributive justice
disclosure. In other words, once the retributive justice disclosure is used to establish general
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Using fairness heuristic theory, Lind (2001) also reveals similar findings in the context of procedural fairness and
fairness-relevant information. Particularly, when fairness-relevant information is presented before procedural
fairness information, “…procedural justice judgments have little effect on (fairness) outcome evaluations" (Lind
2001: 75). These findings also persist for distributive justice.
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fairness perceptions, any subsequent fairness-relevant disclosure is assimilated with the initial
fairness judgment and does not change the initial fairness judgment. Although I would expect
that observers' compliance would be significantly higher when the punishment in the retributive
justice disclosure is fair versus unfair, I would not expect compliance to change significantly
across punishment conditions when the justice-relevant disclosure is subsequently presented. My
expectations are stated formally and graphically depicted below:

HYPOTHESIS 2a: When the tax gap is presented before a retributive
punishment outcome, there will be an interaction effect of punishment outcome and
tax gap information such that the effect of punishment on compliance will be
suppressed when the national tax gap is present versus absent.
HYPOTHESIS 2b: When a punishment outcome is presented before the tax gap, there
will not be an interaction effect of punishment income and tax gap information on
compliance. That is, compliance will not differ significantly when the national tax
gap is present versus absent.
The theoretical model is graphically depicted in Figure 6.

4.3 Research Method
4.3.1 Overview of experiment
To test my predictions, I conduct a 2x2x2 between-participants experiment. My independent
variables are as follows: (1) retributive justice disclosure (operationalized as punishment
outcome, and manipulated as unfair (too lenient) versus fair (just right); (2) justice-relevant
disclosure (operationalized as the national tax gap, and manipulated as present versus absent; and
(3) information sequence (operationalized as the sequence of retributive justice disclosure
relative to justice-relevant disclosure, and manipulated by varying the order in which one
disclosure appears relative to the other). The setting involves a taxpayer in the process of
preparing this year’s tax return and facing challenges due to COVID-19. In response to the
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scenario, participants ultimately provide their compliance intentions as if they were the taxpayer
in the scenario. Below, I provide details of the experiment including participants, experimental
design, dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables.
4.3.2 Participants
Similar to the survey in chapter 3, participants are Canadian taxpayers recruited via Prolific.
Prolific is an online on-demand research platform that connects researchers with high quality,
vetted participants (Prolific n.d.). Research reveals that Prolific participants not only provide
high quality responses that are comparable to participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, but also
are more diverse (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat and Acquisti 2017). Although online participants are
considered to be highly reliable (Farrell, Grenier and Leiby 2017), to further ensure high quality
data, I require participants to have at least a 95% approval rate with successful completion of a
minimum of 20 past Prolific studies, as done in previous research using online participants
(Collum, Jurney & Marshall 2021).
Using Prolific’s custom prescreening filters, I did not allow participants who completed the
survey to access this experiment. Additionally, to be reasonably representative of the Canadian
taxpayer population, participants are randomly selected according to age (between 25 and 70
inclusive) and gender. These selection criteria ensured that the sample was both mature and for
those for whom tax compliance issues are likely to be relevant. I requested 50 participants per
experimental condition and 400 participants completed the instrument. Participants are paid
£1.50 upon completion of the study. This payment represents approximately £7.50 per hour 24
and is regarded as a good rate on Prolific for a survey expected to take 12 minutes to complete.

24

Prolific has a minimum hourly rate of £5.00 per hour.

48

On average, 48.5% of the participants are male, are 34.7 (s.d.=9.7) years old, and have 12
years of work experience. 25 There are no significant differences in age, education, work
experience, income or political beliefs across conditions. Details of demographic measures are
provided in Table 7.

4.3.3 Experimental Design
I conduct a 2x2x2 between-participants experiment, in which I manipulate three independent
variables: retributive justice disclosure, justice-relevant disclosure and information sequence
across eight experimental conditions.
Participants interested in the study clicked on a link to enter the survey and were randomly
assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions. 26 Participants read a scenario about an
entrepreneur named Finley who is in the process of preparing this year’s tax return, despite
COVID-19 related financial challenges. 27 Due to these challenges, Finley’s income was reduced.
Although Finley knows about the government’s COVID-19 recovery benefit program to help
individuals affected by COVID-19, Finley does not qualify for it because Finley’s income is not
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According to Statistics Canada’s age population estimates in 2019
(https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000501), the median age in Canada is 40.8. The median
age of my sample is 34.7, but includes individuals ages 25 to 70, whereas the Statistics Canada median age includes
all ages. According to Statistics Canada’s income Tables by age group in 2017 (the most recent year with data;
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1110023901), the median income in Canada by age group
was $38,400 (ages 25 to 34), $48,000 (ages 35 to 44), $49,100 (ages 45 to 54), $41,300 (ages 55 to 64), and $28,400
(age 65 and over). When I compared the data segmented similarly by age group, the median score for income
category was 3 ($50,000 - $74,999) for all age categories. The trend regarding income and age in my sample appears
reasonably comparative to that in the broader Canadian population. In my statistical analyses, income and age are
not significant covariates.
26
Participants in Prolific’s online pool who are interested in the study, click on the link to enter the survey. This link
redirects participants to the Qualtrics platform where the experiment was programmed. After completing the
experiment, participants are automatically redirected to the Prolific platform.
27
No pronouns were given with respect to Finley to ensure gender neutrality.
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low enough. Each scenario reveals that Finley learns about a retributive justice disclosure,
including the punishment that another taxpayer received for evading $10,500 of taxes.
Depending on the condition, this punishment outcome is varied by being fair (just right) or unfair
(too lenient). Moreover, in each scenario, the justice-relevant disclosure – the national tax gap –
is either present or absent. When the national tax gap is present, it either precedes or follows the
punishment outcome. These independent variables are further explained below.
To ensure the participants read the scenario carefully, I include one attention-check question
and two manipulation check questions after the scenario and before the dependent variable. The
attention check question asked participants “After the CRA’s investigation, what happened to the
taxpayer?” The first manipulation check question asked participants to rate the punishment
imposed for this tax crime, where 1=too lenient, and 11=too harsh. This manipulation check is
the same check used in the survey, which revalidates the strength of the manipulation. The
second manipulation check question asked participants, “In the scenario, did you read anything
about the amount of personal taxes that should be collected by the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA), and are never reported or collected?” Participants must answer all questions accurately,
with the exception of the punishment rating question, 28 before they can proceed. If a question is
answered incorrectly, participants are prompted that the response is incorrect, and are provided a
hint to allow them another opportunity to answer the attention check question. This design
choice allows me to retain participants and as such, no participants are removed from the
experiment (c.f. Berger et al. 2020).

28

The punishment rating question was based on participants’ perceptions of the punishment severity; as such, there
was no correct answer.
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Following these attention and manipulation checks, participants respond to questions about
Finley’s tax compliance intentions. In the scenario, participants ultimately provide tax
compliance intentions from Finley’s perspective. Subsequently, participants provide responses to
other experimental measures. Among these other experimental measures, a final attention check
question is presented (after the dependent variable and in the latter half of the experiment), in
which participants were told, “Please select 5 for this question”. Finally, participants provide
demographic information. Appendix 2 contains the experimental instrument.
4.3.4 Dependent variable
In this experiment, the tax compliance dependent variable is operationalized as the taxpayer’s
compliance intentions for a government-sponsored COVID-19 benefit, i.e., claiming undeserving
emergency relief due to COVID-19. While the tax compliance literature tends to focus on
income tax reporting compliance as the dependent variable (Austin, Bobek, & LaMothe 2020,
Berger et al. 2020, Farrar, Kaplan & Thorne 2019, Trivedi et al. 2003; Worsham 1996), the
unique nature of a global pandemic provides an opportunity to examine another form of
compliance. At the time of data collection, as part of the Canadian government’s COVID-19
economic response plan, financial support was provided to individuals directly impacted by the
COVID-19 pandemic. Affected individuals applied for the COVID-19 benefit and applications
were processed rapidly, in order to “…get money into the pockets of Canadians as quickly as
possible” (Department of Finance Canada, 2020). Fraud rates for this type of program could be
as high as two or three percent, which exceeds the fraud rate of other federal programs, and
COVID-19-claim fraud was a widespread problem at the time of data collection (Cullen and
Everson 2020; Cullen 2020). 29 The extent of this fraud was not only limited to Canada, but
29

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cerb-cra-measures-1.5568835
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cerb-covid-coronavirus-pandemic-1.5840550?__vfz=medium%3Dsharebar
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COVID-19 compliance is a global issue, with millions of dollars in fraudulent claims occurring
in various jurisdictions including the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (Australian
Taxation Office 2020b, Buchanan 2020, Whitcomb 2020).
Examining another form of compliance is important as specifying compliance intentions for
emergency relief due to COVID-19 provides an opportunity to extend the tax compliance
literature by examining a timely and relevant form of compliance. Additionally, as the data
collection (around the end of a calendar year) coincides with the introduction of the governmentsponsored benefits due to COVID-19, it is unlikely income tax reporting (with an April tax filing
deadline in Canada) would be as relevant to taxpayers. Thus, the timing of a global pandemic
provides a unique opportunity to examine another form of compliance, thereby increasing the
realism of the experiment.30 Participants respond to this dependent variable using a 7-point scale
with endpoints of ‘strongly disagree’ (1) and ‘strongly agree’ (7). I measure tax compliance
intentions for a COVID-19 benefit using the following statement: (1) “Finley will submit a claim
for the COVID-19 benefit.” 31 As such, higher scores indicate higher tax compliance intentions,
while lower scores indicate lower tax compliance intentions.
Nevertheless, I also control for income tax reporting compliance intentions, measured using
the following question: (1) “Finley would be tempted to not report all of the customer receipts on
the tax return.” To mitigate order bias, both types of compliance intentions were presented in

30

In response to the financial challenges surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Canada
introduced the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB). The CERB was available from March to October
2020. After CERB ended, the government introduced another emergency relief benefit, the Canada Recovery
Benefit (CRB). The data was collected in October 2020 and January 2021.
31
Asking a single measure of intentions is consistent with other research involving unethical behaviour (c.f. Kaplan,
Pany, Samuels & Zhang 2009; Berger, Perreault & Wainberg 2017).
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random order. Additionally, I perform a subsequent supplemental analysis to explore the
interplay between both types of compliance.

4.3.5 Independent variables
Retributive justice disclosure
Retributive justice disclosure is operationalized as a punishment outcome for a tax offence
(Retributive Punishment Outcome). I manipulate retributive justice disclosure by using two
different punishments for evading $10,500 in taxes, an Unfair punishment (too lenient) and a
Fair punishment (just right). When the punishment is unfair (too lenient), the scenario read that
the taxpayer was required to pay a fine of $100. When the punishment is fair (just right), the
scenario read that the taxpayer was required to pay a fine of 100% of the taxes evaded, i.e.,
$10,500. Both manipulations were established in the survey and revalidated in the experiment.

Justice-relevant disclosure
The justice-relevant disclosure is operationalized as the national tax gap (National Tax Gap).
I manipulate the justice-relevant disclosure by disclosing the national tax gap or not providing
this disclosure to participants. i.e., the national tax gap is either present (National Tax Gap
Present) or absent (National Tax Gap Absent). Participants in the National Tax Gap Present
condition are told that “Recently, Finley learned in the news that the amount of personal income
taxes that should be collected by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), and are never reported
or collected, is $8.7 billion.” Participants in the National Tax Gap Absent condition do not
receive any information about the national tax gap.
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Information sequence
Information sequence is operationalized by varying the order in which the other two
independent variables appear in relation to each other. When the national tax gap precedes the
retributive punishment outcome, I refer to this as National Tax Gap Order-Effect. When the
retributive punishment outcome precedes the national tax gap, I refer to this as Retributive
Punishment Outcome Order-Effect. This manipulation is based on previous literature consistent
with my theoretical framework (van den Bos et. al 1997; Lind 2001).

4.3.6 Control variables
Participants provided details on demographic variables including gender, age, work
experience, education, income, and political beliefs. I also asked participants if they considered
submitting a false COVID-19 benefits claim to be a serious crime. As discussed earlier, I also
controlled for income tax reporting compliance intentions.
As shown in the correlation analysis in Table 8, there are four variables significantly
correlated with the dependent variable: income tax reporting compliance, audit likelihood,
detection likelihood, and COVID-19 claim seriousness. As a result, these variables were
included as covariates in the subsequent statistical analysis, but, as the results do not change
significantly when they are included, I present the results without covariates. 32 Inspecting the
significant correlations reveals that, in general, higher COVID-19 compliance is positively
associated with income tax reporting compliance intentions, audit likelihood, detection

32

As reported in Panel A of Table 10, the three-way interaction is significant (F(1, 386) = 17.81, p=0.02 when all
four covariates are included.
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likelihood, and COVID-19 claim seriousness.

4.4 Results
4.4.1 Manipulation checks

Recall that I vary Retributive Punishment Outcome at two levels (Fair versus Unfair). To
evaluate the effectiveness of this manipulation I ask participants to provide a punishment
severity rating of the punishment for evading $10,500 in taxes, on a scale from 1 (too lenient) to
11 (too harsh). 33 As expected, a punishment with a fine of $100 is rated as most lenient
(m=2.16/11, s.d.=1.53) whereas a punishment severity rating near the midpoint of the scale
(6/11) suggests that the specific punishment is just right. Respondents rated the punishment
condition in which the fine was 100% of the amount of taxes evaded as 4.65/11 (s.d.=2.54),
which is reasonably close to the midpoint of 6/11. The means are in the expected direction, and
the difference the two means is significant, F(1, 398) = 137.80, p<0.01. This result indicates that
the manipulation was effective.
I vary the justice-relevant disclosure as National Tax Gap Present or National Tax Gap
Absent. To ensure that participants attended to this manipulation, I include a manipulation check
prior to the COVID-19 tax compliance decision. Participants are asked, “In the scenario, did you
read anything about the amount of personal taxes that should be collected by the Canada

33

Recall that chapter 3 provides evidence of punishments that are perceived as fair (just right) versus unfair (too
lenient). Similarly, in this experiment, I also ask participants to provide punishment severity ratings for the
punishments imposed in the scenario. Thus, the effectiveness of the manipulation is first revalidated in the
experiment.
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Revenue Agency (CRA), and are never reported or collected?”, where responses were either yes
or no. Among participants, 15.5% (or 62) of them fail this attention check question once. 34
As the Information Sequence manipulation is validated in previous literature consistent with
my theoretical framework (Lind et. al 1997; Lind 2001), a manipulation check was not
conducted.

4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The dependent variable of interest is tax compliance intentions, operationalized as the
taxpayer’s compliance intentions for a government-sponsored COVID-19 benefit, i.e., claiming
undeserving emergency relief due to COVID-19. Table 9, Panel A presents the descriptive
statistics for tax compliance intentions by each experimental condition. The cell means are
consistent with the predicted patterns.

4.4.3 Tests of hypotheses
In hypothesis 1 (H1), I predict a main effect of punishment outcome fairness on observers’
tax compliance such that tax compliance intentions will increase if the punishment is fair and
decrease if the punishment is unfair. Results are consistent with predictions and show that there
is a significant main effect of punishment outcome fairness on compliance (F(1, 398) = 4.28,

34

For comparison, Oppenheimer et al. (2009) had failure rates as high as 46 percent on attention-check questions.
As highlighted in the experimental procedures, there were two attention checks - one before the dependent variable
and the other in the latter half of the experiment. In the first attention check, participants are asked: (1) After the
CRA’s investigation, what happened to the taxpayer? The participants must answer this question correctly before
they can proceed. Among participants, 1.8% (or 7) of them fail this attention check question once. The second
attention check question was embedded among four other rank-based questions. Participants are instructed to select
a rating of 5 on a scale ranging from 1 to 11. Among participants, 0.5% (or 1) of them fail the attention check
question. Statistical inferences remain unchanged after excluding responses for participants who failed the first
attention check question at least once, and participants who failed the second attention check question.
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p=0.04). Consistent with H1, Table 9 Panel A demonstrates that when the punishment outcome
is unfair, the average compliance intentions are lower (m=4.16; s.d.=1.95) compared to when the
punishment outcome is fair (m=4.55; s.d.=1.82). Results of an analysis of variance (Table 9
Panel B) reveal that this difference is significant (F(1, 392) = 4.32, p=0.04). However, caution
must be exercised in interpreting this main effect as interpreting main effects can be misleading
if there is a significant disordinal (crossover) interaction (Jaccard 2001; Kirk 2012).
Consequently, I test Hypothesis 2a (H2a) and Hypothesis 2b (H2b), as H2a, if supported,
predicts a disordinal interaction.
In H2a, I predict that when the national tax gap is presented before the retributive
punishment outcome (National Tax Gap Order-Effect), there will be an interaction effect.
Specifically, compliance will be significantly lower when the national tax gap is present versus
absent. In H2b, I predict that when a retributive punishment outcome is presented before the
national tax gap (Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect), there will not be an interaction
effect. Thus, compliance will not differ significantly when the national tax gap is present versus
absent. Initial evidence of H2a and H2b is first found by the presence of a significant three-way
interaction. As shown on Table 9 Panel B, the three-way interaction term is significant (F(1, 392)
= 4.76, p=0.03). This significant finding indicates that the predicted two-way
interaction effects are significantly different from each other.
To interpret this significant three-way interaction, I next graph the two-way interactions
between punishment outcome and tax gap depending on the order in which one disclosure
appears relative to the other. If H2a and H2b are supported, I should expect to see a different
pattern of means for each two-way interaction, as suggested by the significant three-way
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interaction. As shown in Figures 7a and 7b, the pattern of means differs, which provides
preliminary evidence for H2a and H2b.
H2a posits that the significant main effect of punishment on compliance will be suppressed
when tax gap information is presented before the punishment information. To specifically test
H2a, I do a simple effects analysis. The compliance means when there is no tax gap information
are significantly different from each other (m=4.04 (unfair), m=5.04 (fair); p<0.01, t=-2.81, onetailed). Moreover, the compliance means when there is tax gap information are not significantly
different from each other (m=4.58 (unfair), m=4.10 (fair); p=0.11, t=1.24, one tailed).
Furthermore, compliance means are significantly different from each other when the punishment
outcome is fair and there is no tax gap information versus tax gap information (m=5.04, m=4.10;
p<0.01, t=2.71, one-tailed). Moreover, compliance means are moderately significantly different
from each other when the punishment outcome is unfair and there is no tax gap information
versus tax gap information (m=4.04, m=4.58; p=0.09, t=-1.38, one-tailed). This pattern of means
supports H2a and shows that the significant influence of punishment outcome on compliance is
suppressed when information about the tax gap precedes punishment information. The graph of
this interaction is depicted in Figure 7a.
H2b posits that the significant main effect of punishment on compliance will not be
suppressed when the punishment information is presented before the tax gap information. To test
H2b, I again perform a simple effects analysis. The compliance means when there is no tax gap
information are not significantly different from each other (m=4.04 (unfair), m=4.48 (fair);
p=0.14, t=1.10, one tailed). However, when there is tax gap information, the compliance means
are significantly different from each other m=3.98 (unfair), m=4.58 (fair); p=0.05, t=1.67, one
tailed). These findings are consistent with H2b because they show that compliance intentions are
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not suppressed when information about a punishment outcome precedes tax gap information.
Furthermore, the difference in slopes when the retributive punishment outcome is presented first
provides additional support for H2b. Compliance means are not significantly different from each
other when the punishment outcome is fair and there is no tax gap information versus tax gap
information (m=4.48, m=4.58; p=0.39, t=-0.27, one-tailed). Moreover, compliance means are not
significantly different from each other when the punishment outcome is unfair and there is no tax
gap information versus tax gap information (m=4.04, m=3.98; p=0.44, t=0.16, one-tailed). Thus,
compliance is not suppressed when fairness-relevant information precedes fairness information,
and H2b is supported. The graph of this pattern of means is depicted in Figure 7b. Notably, as I
find support for H2a and H2b, the main effect of retributive punishment outcome (H1) is
qualified by the significant three-way interaction and cannot be interpreted.
Lastly, to more carefully examine the differences across experimental conditions, while
controlling for the variables significantly correlated with the dependent variable, I conduct an
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). Recall that Table 8 presented the correlation matrix, which
revealed four covariates: income tax compliance intentions, audit likelihood, detection
likelihood, and COVID-19 claim seriousness. The ANCOVA uses the same independent
variables used in the ANOVA, the same dependent variable of COVID-19 compliance
intentions, and the four covariates. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the results
persist when controlling for covariates. Table 10 demonstrates that inferences remain unchanged
even when controlling for variables correlated with the dependent variable, as the key three-way
interaction effect remains significant (F(1, 386) = 5.39, p=0.02).
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4.4.4 Supplemental Analysis: Exploratory Analysis on Tax Reporting Compliance
Although providing the COVID-19 relief benefit may be a one-time occurrence, provision of
this benefit may influence perceptions of the tax authority, causing a spillover effect on tax
reporting compliance. Moral consistency theory posits that individuals are either consistently
immoral or consistently moral. Positive consistency suggests that a positive initial behaviour
may have a spillover effect, thereby leading to another positive behaviour. However, negative
consistency suggests that a negative initial behaviour may leads to more negative behaviours
(Mullen & Monin 2016). Consequently, I explore the interplay between COVID-19 compliance
and tax reporting compliance, suggested by the possibility of moral consistency. Specifically, I
explore whether or not individuals who are willing to be unethical on a COVID-19 claim are also
likely to be unethical on tax reporting compliance.
I first conduct a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using tax reporting
compliance35 and COVID-19 compliance as the dependent variables, and Punishment Outcome,
National Tax Gap and Information Sequence as the independent variables. Results of the
MANOVA reveal a moderately significant difference in the three way interaction (F=2.45,
p=0.08). A follow-up ANOVA reveals a significant main effect of Punishment outcome on tax
reporting compliance (F(1, 392) = 33.57, p<0.01, not tabulated), and a significant main effect of
National Tax Gap on tax reporting compliance (F(1, 392) = 16.125, p<0.01, not tabulated).
There is also a moderately significant interaction effect between Punishment outcome and
National Tax Gap (F(1, 392) = 2.77, p=0.09, not tabulated).

35

Recall that participants responded to tax reporting compliance intentions by answering the following question: (1)
“Finley would be tempted to not report all of the customer receipts on the tax return.”
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To more carefully explore the interplay between COVID-19 compliance and tax reporting
compliance, I performed a conditional process analysis (Hayes 2018) for an exploratory model. I
choose to conduct a conditional process analysis to examine the possibility of an indirect effect
(mediation) of COVID-19 compliance, and if it is dependent on the justice-relevant disclosure
(National Tax Gap Absent, National Tax Gap Present), and if the latter relationship is dependent
on the sequence of the justice information (National Tax Gap Order-Effect, Retributive Justice
Order-Effect) (moderated moderation). This, conditional process analysis allows me to analyze
the moderated moderated mediation exploratory model. This exploratory model is an extension
of my theoretical model (see Figure 6), but assumes an additional indirect relationship between
COVID-19 compliance and tax reporting compliance. Figure 8 displays the exploratory model.
Support for this exploratory analysis is provided if the index of moderated moderated
mediation for the model is significant. Table 11 reveals that the index of moderated moderated
mediation is 0.220 and significant, as a bootstrap confidence interval is entirely above zero
(0.011 to 0.529). Notably, the relationship between COVID-19 compliance and Tax Reporting
Compliance is positive and significant (p=0.01). This indicates that as COVID-19 compliance
increases, tax reporting compliance also increases. As further shown in Table 11, when the tax
gap is presented first, there is a significant and negative coefficient of this indirect effect, but
when the retributive punishment outcome is presented first, there is a non-significant and
positive coefficient of this indirect effect. These results indicate that tax reporting compliance
tends to decrease when the tax gap is presented first but increases when the retributive
punishment outcome is presented first.
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However, these findings are sensitive to significant covariates including detection likelihood,
and audit likelihood.36 When these two significant covariates are included, the index of
moderated moderated mediation is 0.128 and not significant, as the bootstrap confidence interval
is not entirely above zero (-0.025 to 0.365, not tabulated). Although the three-way interaction
between retributive punishment outcome, national tax gap and information sequence remains
significant (p=0.04, not tabulated) and the bootstrap confidence interval is entirely above zero
(0.081 to 3.030, not tabulated), the relationship between COVID-19 compliance and tax
reporting compliance remains positive but is moderately significant (p=0.06, not tabulated). This
finding provides some evidence that as COVID-19 compliance increases, tax reporting
compliance also increases, but individuals are more sensitive to misreporting being detected and
audited.

4.4.5 Other Measured Variables
Participants responded to four questions regarding their COVID-19 situation. 37 As my
dependent variable is taxpayer’s compliance intentions for submitting a COVID-19 claim, it is
possible that my results could have been driven by taxpayers’ individual differences with respect
to the impact of COVID-19 on their livelihood. To rule out this possibility I examine whether
these measures differ across experimental conditions.

36

Participants respond to the following questions related to detection likelihood, and audit likelihood respectively:
(1) If Finley does not report all the cash from customers on the tax return, Finley expects the CRA to find out; (2)
Finley expects to be audited by the CRA if all income is not reported. These questions are found in Appendix 2.
37
On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1=not at all and 7=very much so, participants are asked to rate their agreement with
the following statements: (1) I am concerned about COVID's impact on my employment; (2) I am concerned about
COVID's impact on my savings; (3) I am concerned about COVID's impact on my health; (4) I am concerned about
COVID's impact on the health of someone I care about. These questions are also shown in Appendix 2.
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First, to synthesize these items, I conduct an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using the
principal axis factoring method. I find a unidimensional factor with an eigenvalue greater than
one (eigenvalue = 2.42), which explains 60.7% of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the
four-item scale is 0.78, indicating that the scale is relatively reliable (Table 12). Consequently, I
create a single variable (COVID-19 impact) using the average of all four items. Next, I perform
an ANOVA to determine if there are any significant differences across experimental conditions.
Findings reveal that COVID-19 impact does not vary across experimental conditions (F(7, 392) =
0.84, p=0.56, not tabulated). 38
Participants also provide responses to an experimental measure related to overall justice.39
Some researchers suggest that perceptions of overall justice can mediate the relationship between
a specific form of justice and a subsequent behaviour (Ambrose & Schinke 2009). To rule out
this possibility I examine whether perceptions of overall justice differ across experimental
conditions, and also test a process model to determine if overall justice acts as a mediator. The
three items used to measure overall justice were adapted from a well-established overall justice
scale (Ambrose & Schinke 2009). The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.95, indicating a highly
reliable scale (Nunnally 1978). Consequently, I create a single variable (Overall Justice) using
the average of all three items. Next, I perform an ANOVA to determine if there are any
significant differences across experimental conditions. Findings reveal that Overall Justice does
not vary across experimental conditions (F(7, 392) = 1.24, p=0.28, not tabulated). Additionally,

38

Similarly, responses do not vary across experimental conditions when participants are asked: (1) “Before taking
this survey, were you aware that some taxpayers submitted COVID-19 benefit claims even though they did not
qualify?” and (2) “Have you ever submitted a COVID-19 benefit claim?” (F(7, 391) = 1.34, p=0.23 and F(7, 391) =
1.22, p=0.29, not tabulated).
39
On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree, participants are asked to rate their
agreement with the following statements: (1) Usually, the way things work at the CRA are fair; (2) In general, I can
count on the CRA to be fair; (3) For the most part, the CRA treats taxpayers fairly. These questions are also shown
in Appendix 2.
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using a 10,000 bootstrapped sample at a 90 percent confidence interval, process analysis reveals
that overall justice does not act as a significant mediator (not tabulated). The model tested
includes retributive punishment outcome as the independent variable, overall justice as the
meditator, and COVID-19 compliance intentions as the dependent variable. The overall model is
also insignificant (not tabulated). 40
Finally, participants provide responses to perceptions of trust in the tax authority. Lind
(2001) posits that individuals may use perceptions of fair treatment as a substitute for trust. To
rule out the possibility that different perceptions of trust influence my results, I examine whether
perceptions of trust differ across experimental conditions. Participants are asked two questions
regarding perceptions of trust: (1) I trust the CRA to administer the tax system fairly; (2) I trust
the CRA to do the right thing. The Cronbach’s alpha for these combined measures is 0.81,
indicating that the scale is highly reliable (Nunnally 1978). Consequently, I create a single
variable (Trust) using the average the two items. Results of an ANOVA reveal that there are no
significant differences across experimental conditions (F(7, 392) = 0.62, p=0.74, not tabulated).

4.5 Conclusion
This chapter experimentally addresses the second research gap concerning how observers’
compliance intentions are influenced by the knowledge of different punishment outcomes for tax
evaders. Using fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001), I develop hypotheses about the joint impact
of retributive justice outcomes and contextually relevant information about these outcomes (the

40

Variations of this model including: (1) justice-relevant disclosure as the independent variable, overall justice as
the meditator, and COVID-19 compliance intentions as the dependent variable (2) relevant justice disclosure as the
independent variable, overall justice as the meditator, information sequence as a moderator, and COVID-19
compliance intentions as the dependent variable are also insignificant.
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national tax gap) on observers’ compliance intentions. I find a significant three-way interaction
effect of retributive punishment outcome, national tax gap and information sequence on
compliance intentions. I interpret this three-way interaction effect to mean that the two-way
interaction of retributive fairness and the national tax gap is due to the order in which both types
of information appear relative to each other, as predicted by fairness heuristic theory (Lind
2001). Specifically, when the national tax gap precedes retributive fairness information, this
interaction is significant and when the retributive punishment outcome precedes national tax gap
information, this interaction is not significant. These findings show that the salutary effect of fair
punishment is contingent on another contextual variable, national gap. I discuss implications of
this finding in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the tests of hypotheses. Section
5.3 discusses the limitations of this research and future research opportunities. This chapter
concludes with section 5.4.
5.2 Discussion of Hypothesis Testing
My dissertation uses two complementary studies to provide original evidence as to how
taxpayers perceive the appropriateness of punishment for tax evasion, and how observers’
compliance intentions are influenced by the knowledge of different punishment outcomes for tax
evaders. The findings suggest what taxpayers perceive as fair versus unfair punishment
outcomes. Moreover, the findings demonstrate that punishment outcomes matter to observers’
compliance intentions, but the strength of this relationship depends on the presence of the
national tax gap, and the sequence of the national tax gap relative to the punishment outcome.
The first study, a two-part survey, explores what a sample of adult Canadian taxpayers
perceive as punishments for tax evasion that are just or unjust. In the first part of the survey,
participants were randomly assigned to one punishment outcome condition, and asked to rate the
severity of only the punishment condition they were assigned. In the second part of the survey,
participants were asked to rate the severity of all the punishment outcome conditions. As the tax
authority publicly discloses tax misreporting offences and punishments, it is important to
understand what observers perceive as a retributively just punishment outcome. This study
provides original evidence of the propriety of a punishment for tax evasion. Notably, a fair
punishment for tax evasion is a fine equal to the amount of taxes evaded. Thus, my research
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further shows that an authority seeking to maintain the integrity of its system, should ensure that
rigorous, but fair, consequences are enforced.
The second study investigates experimentally how observers’ compliance intentions are
influenced by the knowledge of different punishment outcomes for tax evaders. Specifically, I
examine how observers’ tax compliance intentions are jointly influenced by retributive
punishment outcome and national tax gap disclosures. The tax authority increases disclosures as
part of its commitment to transparency (Government of Canada 2020). Particularly, the tax gap
can “…be a catalyst for bringing transparency…” (Warren 2019: 573) as it provides insights into
the tax challenges that an authority faces, and publicly implies that critical steps are required to
mitigate tax noncompliance (Warren 2019). Although enhancing transparency is believed to have
positive effects, this study reveals that there are some limits to increasing disclosures to achieve
transparency (Roberts 2009).
On the one hand, when the national tax gap disclosure precedes the retributive punishment
outcome, the positive impact on compliance of a fair punishment outcome is suppressed. Thus,
individuals anchor on the tax gap (i.e., use the tax gap as a heuristic) to form a fairness judgment,
and subsequent retributive justice judgments have little effect. On the other hand, when a
retributive punishment outcome precedes the national tax gap disclosure, the positive impact on
compliance of a fair punishment outcome is not suppressed. Thus, individuals anchor on the fact
that a punishment was enforced, and the national tax gap, which shows that others taxpayers are
not punished for tax evasion, will not significantly alter their established fairness judgment. This
further indicates that authorities with a mandate to uphold ethical standards in society should
consider whether releasing national tax gap estimates is a good idea if doing so can reduce the
positive impact on taxpayers’ compliance in some cases.
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Overall, my study reveals that perceptions of punishment outcomes as unfair or fair can have
a differential impact on compliance intentions. However, the effect of punishment outcomes on
compliance intentions can be suppressed, depending on the presence or absence of the national
tax gap, and the order in which the justice disclosure appears relative to tax gap information.
Thus, providing retributive justice disclosures and other justice-relevant disclosures, like the tax
gap, may not necessarily be as beneficial as the tax authority intends, and may had adverse
consequences.

5.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
As with all research, this research has various limitations that provide opportunities for future
research. First, the primary dependent variable in the experiment examines compliance intentions
for a government-sponsored COVID-19 benefit, i.e., claiming undeserving emergency relief due
to COVID-19. This dependent variable is different from the traditional compliance literature
which tends to focus on income tax reporting compliance (Austin, Bobek, & LaMothe 2020,
Berger et al. 2020, Farrar, Kaplan & Thorne 2019, Trivedi et al. 2003; Worsham 1996).
Notwithstanding, COVID-19 compliance remains a global issue, with millions of dollars in
fraudulent claims occurring in various jurisdictions including the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia (Australian Taxation Office 2020b, Buchanan 2020, Whitcomb 2020).
Thus, I extend the tax compliance literature by examining a timely, relevant and costly form of
compliance. Future research is warranted to examine the effects of fraudulent COVID-19 claims
on taxpayers’ perceptions of the tax authority’s power, and whether or not this relationship
subsequently affects income tax reporting compliance. Second, the findings of this research are
based on the perspectives of Canadian taxpayers. Examining perspectives from Canadian
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taxpayers is important as the Canadian government continues to proactively disclose information
on punishment outcomes and the national tax gap as part of its mandate of proactive
dissemination of information (Government of Canada 2020). Future research can examine
whether taxpayers in other locations have similar perceptions of punishment outcomes, and how
these perceptions can influence income tax reporting compliance. Finally, it is possible that
participants’ responses may have been biased as they would be hesitant to display
noncompliance regarding a time-sensitive COVID-19 benefit. To minimize response bias
participants are assured that all responses will remain anonymous, and all compliance intentions
questions are asked from a third-person perspective. Doing so is consistent with prior tax
compliance research (e.g., Farrar, Kaplan & Thorne 2019), and is helpful for capturing more
honest responses, particularly with sensitive questions subject to social desirability bias (Chung
& Monroe 2003). Future research can examine whether there are differences in responses for
benefit compliance when compliance questions are asked from the first-person versus thirdperson perspective.
Researchers can continue to offer insights about the psychological motivation for claiming an
undeserving COVID-19 claim. Moreover, in some jurisdictions like the United States, United
Kingdom and Australia, tax authorities have requested that taxpayers repay any overpaid
COVID-19 benefits (Glavas 2020, Gov.UK 2020b, Friedman 2020). Perhaps evidence on the
most effective procedures that tax authorities can implement to recoup these undeserving funds
may be of interest to tax authorities around the world. Moreover, exploring taxpayers’ responses
to what appears to be an inefficient use of millions of taxpayers’ dollars may offer some insights
for new research questions, possibly employing a survey or qualitative interviews.
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5.4 Conclusions
This research contributes to the growing but limited tax literature on retributive justice and
extends fairness heuristic theory to consider retributive justice. First, by providing original
evidence of what constitutes a fair versus unfair punishment outcome and examining the effect of
these punishment outcomes on compliance, this research brings additional insights to the
retributive justice literature. I explore retributive justice disclosures at a more fine-grained level,
thereby providing an incremental contribution to the retributive justice literature by
demonstrating the differential impact of retributive justice perceptions on subsequent behaviour.
Second, this research is the first to extend fairness heuristic theory to a retributive justice context.
Although this theory was formulated for procedural, distributive and interactional justice (c.f.
Lind 2001), and tends to focus on organizational contexts, extending fairness heuristic theory to
a retributive justice setting is reasonable due to the social nature of fairness itself. The theory
examines fairness and how individuals apply fairness perceptions in social situations. Since
fairness is a “social heuristic to determine how a person approaches social…situations” (Lind
2001: 69), it is reasonable to conclude that retributive justice will impact tax-related behaviour,
which is social behaviour.
Finally, this research has practical implications for tax policy. Tax authorities publicly
disclose or shed light on offences and punishments for tax misreporting on their websites and
other social media newsfeeds, with the goal of deterring observers. Similarly, the tax authority
has a mandate to increase transparency as they disclose noncompliance. My research suggests
that bringing attention to unethical behaviours may not always be beneficial. There may be
unintended consequences of transparency and public accountability on citizens’ compliance
intentions, depending on which type of justice information is initially presented to taxpayers.
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Thus, tax authorities should consider what information it discloses, and when, as there may be
unintended adverse consequences on taxpayers’ compliance intentions.
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FIGURES
Survey
Figure 1A Means of Punishment Ratings for Part One of the Survey

Figure 1B Means of Punishment Ratings for Part Two of the Survey
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Figure 2 Mean Ranks for Punishment Ratings (Kruskal-Wallis test)
300
250
200
150

Punishment
Severity
Mean
Ranks

100
50
0
Fine $100

Fine $10,500

Jail time 48
months
Fine $21,000

These results suggest that there are significant differences in punishment
severity ratings across the conditions χ² (10)=151.23, p <0.01.
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Figure 3 Fine amounts suggested as just right (by frequency)

Note: Participants were asked a qualitative question to determine the appropriate punishment for evading $10,500 in
taxes. 331 participants agree that a fine of 100% of the taxes evaded is appropriate as the average fine proposed was
$11,000, 80 participants listed either $10,000 or $10,500 as a fine amount that is just right, and 63 participants listed
either $5,000 or $5,250 as a fine amount that is just right.
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Figure 4 Means of Punishment Ratings Part One versus Part Two

Means Part Two

Means Part One

Note: Means being compared are the punishment severity ratings that participants provide when rating the same
punishment both in the first part and the second part of the survey.
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Experiment
Figure 5a Predicted Pattern of Means for Tests of Hypothesis 2a

Note: This figure represents the predicted pattern of means for Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a predicts that when the
national tax gap is presented before the retributive punishment outcome (National Tax Gap Order-Effect), the effect
on observers' compliance from the retributive justice disclosure will be suppressed.

Figure 5b Predicted Pattern of Means for Tests of Hypothesis 2b

Note: This figure represents the predicted pattern of means for Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b predicts that when the
retributive punishment outcome is presented before the national tax gap (Retributive Punishment Outcome OrderEffect), observers will anchor on the retributive punishment outcome and the tax gap will not significantly alter their
established fairness judgment.
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Figure 6 Theoretical Model for Experiment

Note: See Table 9 for variable definitions.
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Figure 7a Observed Pattern of Means for Tests of Hypothesis 2a

Note: This figure represents the observed pattern of means for Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a predicts that when the
national tax gap is presented before the retributive punishment outcome (National Tax Gap Order-Effect), the effect
on observers' compliance from the retributive justice disclosure will be suppressed.

Figure 7b Observed Pattern of Means for Tests of Hypothesis 2b

Note: This figure represents the observed pattern of means for Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b predicts that when the
retributive punishment outcome is presented before the national tax gap (Retributive Punishment Outcome OrderEffect), observers will anchor on the retributive punishment outcome and the tax gap will not significantly alter their
established fairness judgment.
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Figure 8 Exploratory Analysis: Theoretical Model

Justice-relevant
disclosure

COVID-19
compliance

Information
sequence

Retributive justice
Disclosure

Tax reporting
compliance

Note: See Table 9 for variable definitions.

79

TABLES
Survey
Table 1 Demographic measures
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Table 2 Punishment conditions
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Table 3 Correlation matrix
Dependent Variable

Demographic & Other Control Variables

Punishment

Work

severity rating

Gender1

Age

Education2

Experience

Income3

Political

Tax Evasion

beliefs4

Seriousness

1

-.013

.110*

Gender

-.013

1

.062

.008

.114*

-.082

.140*

.060

Age

.110*

.062

1

.874**

-.086

.115*

-.051

.047

Work Experience

.121*

.008

.874**

1

-.149**

.126*

-.040

-.027

.011

.114*

-.086

-.149**

1

.226**

.070

.085

.126*

.226**

1

-.133*

-.075

Punishment severity

.121*

.011

.052

.014

-.143**

rating

Education
Income

.052

-.082

.115*

Political beliefs

.014

.140*

-.051

-.040

.070

-.133*

1

.038

-.143**

.060

.047

-.027

.085

-.075

.038

1

Tax Evasion
Seriousness

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
1Gender

is coded as 1= male, 2 = female and 3 =other. 2Education is coded from 1= less than high school up to 7= other.

3Income

is coded from 1 = less than $25,000 up to 6 = prefer not to answer. 4Political beliefs are coded from 1 = very conservative up to 7 = very

liberal. Please refer to Appendix 1 for further details on how each variable is coded.
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Table 4 Means of Punishment Ratings for Part One and Part Two of the Survey (NS=331)
Punishment Conditions

Part One
Mean
Standard
Deviation

n

na

Part Two
Mean

Standard
Deviation

No punishment
Fine only - $100
Fine only - $5,250
Fine only - $10,500
Fine only - $21,000

30
31
28
30
30

3.60
2.94
5.36
5.97
6.53

1.96
2.44
2.38
1.77
2.39

300
303
301
301

1.58
4.36
5.45
6.87

2.53
1.86
2.05
1.71

Jail time only – 15 months
Jail time only – 48 months
Jail time & fine – 15 months, $10,500
Jail time & fine – 48 months, $10,500
Jail time & fine – 15 months, $21,000
Jail time & fine – 48 months, $21,000

30
31
31
31
29
30

8.33
8.35
8.71
8.39
8.17
9.10

2.86
2.14
2.24
2.06
1.91
1.63

301
300
300
300
302
301

7.43
8.70
7.69
8.91
8.39
9.16

2.41
1.73
2.60
2.97
3.16
1.87

a

In part one of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one punishment disclosure condition and asked to
rate the severity of only the punishment condition they were assigned. In part two of the survey, participants were
asked to rate the severity of all the punishment conditions. If a participant is randomly assigned to a condition in the
first part of the survey, the response to this punishment severity rating is removed in the second part analysis. For
instance, if a participant is assigned to the condition with a fine of 100% of the amount of taxes evaded, the response
to this punishment severity rating is removed when analyzing the second part of the survey. This approach aims to
minimize the possibility that a participant’s punishment severity rating in the second part of the survey, is influenced
by the punishment severity rating provided in the first part of the survey, where participants were randomly assigned
to conditions with this single punishment.
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Table 5 Means of Punishment Ratings Part One and Part Two (NS=331)
Punishment Conditions
n

Part One
Mean
Standard
Deviation

Part Two
Mean
Standard
Deviation

Z-Value

PValue

No punishment
Fine only - $100
Fine only - $5,250
Fine only - $10,500
Fine only - $21,000

30
31
28
30
30

3.60
2.94
5.36
5.97
6.53

1.96
2.44
2.38
1.77
2.39

2.35
4.57
6.07
6.03

2.80
2.23
2.80
2.16

-2.03
-2.89
-1.30
-1.72

0.04
<0.01
0.20
0.09

Jail time only – 15 months
Jail time only – 48 months

30
31

8.33
8.35

2.86
2.14

7.60
8.29

3.05
2.38

-2.05
-0.14

0.04
0.89

Jail time & fine – 15 months,
$10,500
Jail time & fine – 48 months,
$10,500
Jail time & fine – 15 months,
$21,000
Jail time & fine – 48 months,
$21,000

31

8.71

2.24

8.23

2.49

-1.42

0.16

31

8.39

2.06

8.55

2.03

-0.51

0.61

29

8.17

1.91

7.59

2.21

-1.77

0.08

30

9.10

1.63

9.23

1.36

-0.26

0.80
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Table 6 Effect of Fines, Jail Time and combination of fines and jail time on Punishment
Severity ratings

Dependent Variable: Punishment severity
rating

Regression
coefficient

Standard
Error

t

one-tailed
p-value

0.401

12.496

<0.01

0.307

0.005

5.463

<0.01

Fine

-0.094

0.000

-0.629

0.530

Fine * Jail time

-0.045

0.000

-0.295

0.768

R2

9.90%

Intercept
Jail time

2

9.10%

Adjusted R
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Experiment
Table 7 Demographic measures
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Table 8 Correlation matrix
Dependent Variable

COVID-19 compliance

Control Variables

COVID-19

Income tax

compliance

reporting

intentions

Compliance
1

Audit

Detection

likelihood

likelihood

**

.111

1

.253

*

COVID-19
claim
seriousness
**

.130**

.347**

.362**

.083

1

.634**

.038

1

-.029

.150

intentions a
Income tax reporting
Compliance

b

Audit likelihood c
Detection likelihood d
COVID-19 claim

1

e

seriousness
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
a
I measure COVID-19 compliance intentions using the following statement: (1) “Finley will submit a claim
for the COVID-19 benefit.”
b
Income tax reporting compliance intentions was measured using the following statement (on a 7 point
scale): (1) “Finley would be tempted to not report all of the customer receipts on the tax return.”
c
Audit likelihood is measured using the statement: (1) “Finely expects to be audited by the CRA if a false
COVID-19 claim is submitted.”
d
Detection likelihood is measured using the statement: (1) “If Finley submits a false COVID-19 claim,
Finley expects the CRA to find out.”
e
COVID-19 claim seriousness is measured using the statement: (1) “I think that submitting a false COVID19 claim is a serious crime.”
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TABLE 9 The Effect of Retributive Punishment Outcome, National Tax Gap and Information
Sequence on Tax Compliance Intentions
Panel A Descriptive Statistics with Data Presented by the Information Sequence Manipulation
Mean, (standard deviation), [n]

Retributive
Punishment
Outcome
Too lenient

National Tax Gap OrderEffect
National Tax Gap
Absent
Present
4.04
(1.91)
[50]

4.58
(2.02)
[50]

Retributive Punishment Outcome
Order-Effect
National Tax Gap
Absent
Present
4.04
(2.08)
[50]

4.31
(1.97)
[100]

Just Right

5.04
(1.63)
[50]

4.10
(1.83)
[50]

4.54
(1.83)
[100]

4.04
(1.98)
[100]

4.01
(1.93)
[100]

4.48
(1.91)
[50]

4.57
(1.79)
[100]

Total

3.98
(1.78)
[50]

Total

4.16
(1.95)
[200]

4.58
(1.82)
[50]

4.76
(1.79)
[100]

4.53
(1.86)
[100]

4.34
(1.93)
[100]

4.26
(1.99)
[100]

4.44
(1.88)
[200]
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4.34
(1.83)
[100]
4.55
(1.82)
[200]

4.28
(1.82)
[100]
4.27
(1.90)
[200]

4.28
(1.92)
[100]

4.40
(1.92)
[200]

4.31
(1.87)
[200]
4.35
(1.89)
[400]

TABLE 9 Continued
Panel B Analysis of variance on Compliance Intentions a
Source of variation

df

MS

F

p-valueg
(two-tailed)

Retributive punishment outcome b

1

15.21

4.32

0.04

National Tax Gap c

1

0.81

0.23

0.63

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap

1

10.89

3.09

0.08

1

2.89

0.82

0.37

Retributive punishment outcome x
Information Sequence

1

1.69

0.48

0.49

National Tax Gap x
Information Sequence

1

1.21

0.34

0.56

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap x
Information Sequence

1

16.81

4.76

0.03

392

3.52

Information Sequence

d

Error

Panel C National Tax Gap Order-Effect e ANOVA
Source of variation

Df

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

National Tax Gap

1

2.00

0.58

0.45

Retributive punishment outcome

1

3.38

0.99

0.32

National Tax Gap x
Retributive punishment outcome (H2a)

1

27.38

7.98

<0.01

196

3.43

Error

Panel D Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect f ANOVA
Source of variation

df

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

Retributive punishment outcome

1

13.52

3.75

0.05

National Tax Gap

1

0.02

0.01

0.94

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap (H2b)

1

0.32

0.09

0.77

196

3.61

Error
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TABLE 9 Continued
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics by condition in panel A, an analysis of variance in panel B which
shows the significant three-way interaction, the testing of Hypotheses 2a in panel C and Hypothesis 2b in Panel D.
a

Compliance refers to COVID-19 claim compliance. Participants respond to the following question (on a 7 point
scale): (1) “Finley will submit a claim for the COVID-19 benefit.”
b
Retributive Punishment Outcome refers to the two different punishments for evading $10,500 in taxes, an Unfair
punishment (too lenient) and a Fair punishment (just right).
c
National Tax Gap refers to the operationalization of a justice-relevant disclosure in a tax context. The national tax
gap is either present (National Tax Gap Present) or absent (National Tax Gap Absent).
d
Information Sequence is operationalized by varying the sequencing of each disclosure, and manipulated by having
the national tax gap precede the retributive punishment outcome (National Tax Gap Order-Effect) or having the
retributive punishment outcome precede the national tax gap (Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect).
e
National Tax Gap Order-Effect refers to when the national tax gap precedes the retributive punishment outcome.
f
Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect refers to when the retributive punishment outcome precedes the
national tax gap.
g
In this table, and all the tables that follow, one-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed pvalues are used for non-directional predictions.
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TABLE 10 The Effect of Retributive Punishment Outcome, National Tax Gap and Information
Sequence on Tax Compliance Intentions
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance on Compliance Intentions a
Source of variation

df

MS

F

p-valueg
(two-tailed)

Retributive punishment outcome b

1

9.64

2.92

0.09

National Tax Gap c

1

0.11

0.04

0.85

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap

1

9.91

3.00

0.08

Information Sequence d

1

7.76

2.35

0.13

Retributive punishment outcome x
Information Sequence

1

0.97

0.29

0.59

National Tax Gap x
Information Sequence

1

3.83

1.16

0.28

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap x
Information Sequence

1

17.81

5.39

0.02

386

3.30

Error

Panel B National Tax Gap Order-Effect e ANOVA
Source of variation

df

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

National Tax Gap

1

3.95

1.20

0.27

Retributive punishment outcome

1

5.56

1.69

0.20

National Tax Gap x
Retributive punishment outcome (H2a)

1

30.50

9.28

<0.01

191

3.29

Error

Panel C Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect f ANOVA
Source of variation

df

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

Retributive punishment outcome

1

4.32

1.31

0.25

National Tax Gap

1

2.62

0.80

0.37

Retributive punishment outcome x
National Tax Gap (H2b)

1

0.85

0.26

0.61

190

3.29

Error

91

TABLE 10 Continued
a

Compliance refers to COVID-19 claim compliance. Participants respond to the following question (on a 7 point
scale): (1) “Finley will submit a claim for the COVID-19 benefit.”
b
Retributive Punishment Outcome refers to the two different punishments for evading $10,500 in taxes, an Unfair
punishment (too lenient) and a Fair punishment (just right).
c
National Tax Gap refers to the operationalization of a justice-relevant disclosure in a tax context. The national tax
gap is either present (National Tax Gap Present) or absent (National Tax Gap Absent).
d
Information Sequence is operationalized by varying the sequencing of each disclosure, and manipulated by having
the national tax gap precede the retributive punishment outcome (National Tax Gap Order-Effect) or having the
retributive punishment outcome precede the national tax gap (Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect).
e
National Tax Gap Order-Effect refers to when the national tax gap precedes the retributive punishment outcome.
f
Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect refers to when the retributive punishment outcome precedes the
national tax gap.
g
In this table, and all the tables that follow, one-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed pvalues are used for non-directional predictions.
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Table 11 Moderated Moderated Mediation Analysis: Statistical Results
Primary Path

Coeff.

SE

p-value

Retributive punishment outcome → COVID-19 compliance

1.00

0.38

0.01

Retributive punishment outcome x National Tax Gap → COVID-19
compliance

-1.48

0.53

0.01

Retributive punishment outcome x National Tax Gap x Information Sequence
→ COVID-19 compliance

1.64

0.75

0.03

COVID-19 compliance → Tax Reporting Compliance

0.13

0.05

0.01

Retributive punishment outcome → Tax Reporting Compliance

0.96

0.18

<0.01

Moderated moderated mediation results
Index of moderated moderated mediation = .220 (SE 0.13). A 95% bootstrap confidence interval based on 10,000
bootstrap samples was entirely above zero (0.011 to 0.529), meaning the moderated moderated mediation model is
significant. The conditional indirect effects of Retributive Punishment Outcome on Tax Reporting Compliance Intentions
through COVID-19 compliance and moderated by Tax Gap differ significantly according to Information Sequence.
Conditional Indirect Effects of Retributive Punishment Outcome on Tax Reporting Compliance Intentions
through COVID-19 compliance, Tax Gap and Information Sequence
Tax Gap Order-Effect – indirect effect coefficient of -0.198 (standard error 0.11), confidence interval entirely below zero
(-0.443 to -0.026).
Retributive Punishment Outcome Order-Effect – indirect effect coefficient of +0.021 (standard error 0.077), confidence
interval not entirely above zero (-0.135 to 0.190).
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Table 12 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)a
COVID-19 impact
Item
1.
2.
3.
4.

Factor Loadings
I am concerned about COVID's impact on my
employment b
I am concerned about COVID's impact on my
savings b
I am concerned about COVID's impact on my
health b
I am concerned about COVID's impact on the
health of someone I care about b

0.68
0.72
0.68
0.68

Eigenvalue
% of Variance explained
a
b

2.42
60.70%

EFA performed using principal axis factor analysis.
Participants rate their agreement on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1=not at all and 7=very much so.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Survey Instrument

Screen 1: Welcome Screen [All Conditions]

95

Screen 2: Jail time only – 15 months [Condition 1]

96

Screen 3: Jail time only – 15 months [Condition 1]

97

Screen 4: Jail time only – 15 months [Condition 1]

98

Screen 2: Jail time only – 48 months [Condition 2]

99

Screen 3: Jail time only – 48 months [Condition 2]

100

Screen 4: Jail time only – 48 months [Condition 2]

101

Screen 2: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 3]

102

Screen 3: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 3]

103

Screen 4: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 3]

104

Screen 2: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 4]

105

Screen 3: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 4]

106

Screen 4: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $21,000 [Condition 4]

107

Screen 2: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 5]

108

Screen 3: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 5]

109

Screen 4: Jail time and fine – Jail time 15 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 5]

110

Screen 2: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 6]

111

Screen 3: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 6]

112

Screen 4: Jail time and fine – Jail time 48 months & fine $10,500 [Condition 6]

113

Screen 2: Fine only – $21,000 [Condition 7]

114

Screen 3: Fine only – $21,000 [Condition 7]

115

Screen 4: Fine only – $21,000 [Condition 7]

116

Screen 2: Fine only – $10,500 [Condition 8]

117

Screen 3: Fine only – $10,500 [Condition 8]

118

Screen 4: Fine only – $10,500 [Condition 8]

119

Screen 2: Fine only – $5,250 [Condition 9]

120

Screen 3: Fine only – $5,250 [Condition 9]

121

Screen 4: Fine only – $5,250 [Condition 9]

122

Screen 2: Fine only – $100 [Condition 10]

123

Screen 3: Fine only – $100 [Condition 10]

124

Screen 4: Fine only – $100 [Condition 10]

125

Screen 2: No mention of punishment [Condition 11]

126

Screen 3: No mention of punishment [Condition 11]

127

Screen 4: No mention of punishment [Condition 11]

128

Screen 5: Qualitative question [All Conditions]

129

Screen 6: Tax evasion significance [All Conditions]

130

Screen 7: Rate all punishments [All Conditions and randomly presented]

131

Screen 8: Tax evasion perceptions [All Conditions]

132

Screen 9: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

133

Screen 10: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

134

Screen 11: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

135

Screen 12: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

136

Screen 13: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

137

Screen 14: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

138

Screen 15: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

139

Appendix 2: Experimental Instrument

Screen 1: Welcome Screen [All Conditions]

140

Screen 2: Sequencing Justice-relevant disclosure (national tax gap), retributive justice outcome
fair (just right) [Condition 1]

141

Screen 2: Retributive justice outcome fair (just right), No justice-relevant disclosure [Condition
2]

142

Screen 2: Sequencing Justice-relevant disclosure (national tax gap), retributive justice outcome
unfair (too lenient) [Condition 1] [Condition 3]

143

Screen 2: Retributive justice outcome unfair (too lenient), No justice-relevant disclosure
[Condition 4]

144

Screen 2: Sequencing Retributive justice outcome fair (just right), Justice-relevant disclosure
(national tax gap) [Condition 5]

145

Screen 2: Retributive justice outcome fair (just right), No justice-relevant disclosure [Condition
6]

146

Screen 2: Sequencing Retributive justice outcome unfair (too lenient), Justice-relevant disclosure
(national tax gap) [Condition 7]

147

Screen 2: Retributive justice outcome unfair (too lenient), No justice-relevant disclosure
[Condition 8]

148

Screen 3: Attention/ Manipulation checks [All Conditions]
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Screen 4: Attention/ Manipulation checks [All Conditions]

150

Screen 5: Attention/ Manipulation checks [Fair (just right) Conditions]
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Screen 5: Attention/ Manipulation checks [Unfair (too lenient) Conditions]
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Screen 6: Dependent Variable COVID-19 compliance [All Conditions]

153

Screen 7: Control Variable income tax reporting compliance [All Conditions]
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Screen 8: Other measures [All Conditions]
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Screen 9: Other measures [All Conditions]
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Screen 10: Other measures [All Conditions]

157

Screen 11: Other measures [All Conditions]
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Screen 12: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

159

Screen 13: Demographic questions [All Conditions]
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Screen 14: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

161

Screen 15: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

162

Screen 16: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

163

Screen 17: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

164

Screen 18: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

165

Screen 19: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

166

Screen 20: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

167

Screen 21: Demographic questions [All Conditions]

168

Screen 22: Demographic questions [All Conditions]
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